By In Stuff

Hiller and the Modern Closer

This postseason, as you no doubt have noticed, has been all about the shifting roles of relief pitchers. It has been fun to watch — like watching history in fast forward. The transformation began with an old-fashioned decision by Baltimore’s Buck Showalter to keep his best reliever, Zach Britton, in bubble wrap because the game was tied, a decision Buck drowned with. It continued with Terry Francona’s dazzling use of Cleveland’s super-reliever Andrew Miller in high-leverage middle inning situations.

In San Francisco, Bruce Bochy tried to close out the Chicago Cubs with a tedious batter-by-batter matchup strategy, and that didn’t work out. Thursday night in Washington, the Nationals’ Dusty Baker tried his own version of that with a record-breaking six-pitcher inning. That one didn’t work out either.

And finally, there was the Dodgers’ manager Dave Roberts, who decided to call for season-long closer Kenley Jansen with nobody out in the seventh and let him pitch until his arm fell off. Jansen threw more pitches than he ever had in a major league game and, when he’d run out of juice, Roberts went to the pen to bring out Game 4 starter and living legend Clayton Kershaw, which led to a stirring final two outs and a Dodgers victory.

But before looking ahead to see what it all might bring, let’s look back at the remarkable story of John Hiller and his 1973 season for the ages. His past just might be baseball’s future.

* * *

John Hiller grew up in Canada, just outside of Toronto, and so he grew up loving hockey, not baseball. He used to say that he would have given up one year of professional baseball for just one game as goaltender of the Maple Leafs.

But his talent was for throwing a baseball. “He has a weight problem,” Baseball Digest reported in 1967, “but that can be cured. Looks promising.” The best Canadian pitcher in baseball history before Hiller arrived on the scene was probably a Deadballer named Russ Ford, who won 99 games (though 26 of those was for the Buffalo Buffeds of the Federal League). In 1965, though, two Canadians made their debut. One was Hiller. The other was future Hall of Famer Fergie Jenkins. It was a Canadian bumper crop.

Hiller began his career as a multi-use pitcher for the Detroit Tigers in the mid-to-late 1960s. He started. He relieved. He did whatever was asked. He pitched effectively for the World Champion Tigers in ‘68. He was less effective in ‘69. He rebounded a bit in 1970. He seemed destined to be one of middling baseball cards that show up in every pack.

Then, in January of 1971, something shattering happened to John Hiller: He had three heart attacks on the same day.

Doctors were able to save his life, of course — it wouldn’t be much of a baseball story if they had not. But they told Hiller that his baseball career was over. Hiller, of course, refused to accept it. The Sporting News recounted Hiller’s wonderfully understated conversation with Tigers GM Jim Campbell after he returned from the hospital.

HILLER: “I’ll be a little late for spring training.”

CAMPBELL: “What’s the matter?”

HILLER: “I had a little heart flare up.”

CAMPBELL: “When did this happen?”

HILLER: “January. I was in the hospital for four weeks and now I’m home.”

CAMPBELL: “Why didn’t you say anything?”

HILLER: “I didn’t want to worry anybody.”

Hiller’s recovery was movie stuff.  He returned home to Duluth, Minn., and worked as a furniture salesman. But during various breaks and his lunch time, he worked out. The doctors would not let him even throw a baseball — not entirely sure why — but he ran two miles every day. He swam at least a mile. He played various sports like paddleball. He lost 40 pounds and dropped his cholesterol to what one of his doctors called “the level of a 12-year old.”

“The doctors have never even hinted that I’d be able to pitch again,” he admitted to reporters in early 1972.

Even after doctors cleared him to go to spring training, the Tigers remained doubtful. The entire sports world — but particularly people in Detroit — were still traumatized by the on-field death of Detroit Lions receiver Chuck Hughes. He had collapsed while running to the huddle toward the end of a Lions-Bears game, and he died shortly afterward of a massive heart attack.

The Tigers reluctantly agreed to let Hiller come back, but only as a minor-league instructor. And it was during his time as an instructor that Hiller picked up a new kind of change-up, one that would complete his pitching arsenal. Mixing his good fastball with a wipeout slider and that new change-up, he became a whole new pitcher. He threw so impressively enough for scouts that the Tigers called him up in early July even though he had not pitched in a single minor-league game. He gave up a bomb to Dick Allen in his first appearance back. But he allowed just two runs in his next 11 appearances. The Tigers determined he was back..

On October 1, with the Tigers closing ground on the first place Red Sox, Hiller got a start against Milwaukee, and he threw a complete game, allowing just one run. In the ALCS against Oakland, he made three appearances and did not allow a run. The Tigers’ manager decided that Hiller was ready to become something new.

That Tigers’ manager was a son of a gun named Billy Martin.

Billy Martin is not yet in the Baseball Hall of Fame, and he might not ever get there, but the man was a fantastic manager. He was not fantastic because of his famous rage — that’s part of what kept him from becoming legendary. He was fantastic, I think, because he was not just willing to break with the times, he INSISTED on it. The man smashed conventions, broke all the dishes, did what other managers were too earthbound to do. If he needed to have his starters finish every game to win, he’d do that (in 1980, Oakland starters went at least eight innings 105 times, most in the last 70 seasons). If he thought a star like Reggie Jackson should bunt (either for strategy reason or just to humble the man), he would make Reggie Jackson damn well bunt no matter what the fallout might be. He would send Rickey Henderson EvERY SINGLE TIME the guy got on base.

Heck, if he wanted to shake up the team, he might put all their names in a hat and draw a lineup out of a hat.*

*This has nothing whatsoever to do with the story, but I can’t let the opportunity pass to tell the story of Detroit’s August 13, 1972 game against Cleveland. It was the first game of a doubleheader. The Tigers had lost four in a row and 10 of their last 13. They were fading. Martin was going out of his head. So that day he decided to pull the lineup out of a hat. And, man, that lineup was a gem.. Thirty-seven year old slugger Norm Cash led off (for only the second time in his career). Ed Brinkman (he of the .300 career slugging percentage) hit clean up. Al Kaline and Bill Freehan didn’t even make it into the lineup.

And so what happened? Magic happened of course. The Tigers won 3-2. They beat Gaylord Perry, who would go on to win Cy Young Award. And the key player? Cleanup slugger Eddie Brinkman, who doubled home the tying run and scored the winning.

In 1973, Martin decided to make John Hiller into a weapon. All year, whenever the Tigers got into a big situation — didn’t matter the inning, didn’t matter how many or few hitters were on base, all that mattered was that Martin felt that buzz of uncertainty — he brought in John Hiller.

The baseball term “high leverage” was not a thing in 1973. Neither was the statistic Win Probability Added. But Martin brought Hiller into every high-leverage situation the team faced — when the season ended, Hiller had what to that point was the highest Win Probability Added of any relief pitcher in baseball history, Nobody knew it then, but it was also the sixth-highest WPA for ANY pitcher since 1930, higher than any year Koufax year, higher than Gibson’s 1968 season, higher than Seaver’s 1969 year.

Win Probability Added is just that — you add (and subtract) the win percentages based on what a pitcher or hitter does. It is a quirky and contentious statistic because it makes some outs much more valuable than others. Retiring the first batter of the game, for instance, will be worth much less than getting an out in the ninth inning with the bases loaded and the pitcher’s team up by one run.

In other words, it’s the perfect statistic to quantify Hiller’s 1973 season. He came into clutch situations time after time after time. And he was spectacular. Martin brought Hiller into tie games, into close games, in the early innings, in the middle innings, in the late innings. Nine times, Martin brought Hiller in just to get the final out. Four times, Martin brought Hiller in and left him out there for at least four innings. Hiller saved 38 games, a then-Major League record. But he also won 10 games because Martin kept using him in non-save situations too. He came in with 84 runners on base, which is a lot. He stranded 71 of them, which was mind-blowing.

How amazing a year was it? Baseball Reference calculates he was 8.1 wins above replacement that year. That WAR is the second-best ever for a reliever (behind only Goose Gossage’s absurd 1975 season) and ahead of many of even the great starting pitching seasons. Nolan Ryan, for example, never had an 8.1 WAR season. But more to the point, modern-day closers can’t even come close to that kind of production. Mariano Rivera is the best modern day closer, just about everyone would agree, and he never had more than 5.0 WAR in a season (and that 5 WAR season was before he became a closer — his WAR high as a closer is 4.3).

If you add Trevor Hoffman’s TWO best seasons together, it doesn’t add up to 8.1 WAR.

But maybe you don’t like WAR as a statistic, especially for relievers. There are numerous other ways to quantify how much more valuable John Hiller was in 1973 than any of the star closers of the last 25 years. And it was something new. Yes, there had been relief pitchers who were used in many different situations — Hoyt Wilhelm, Dick Radatz, Tug McGraw, Jim Abernathy, Mike Marshall among others — and were extremely valuable.

But no reliever — not even Mike Marshall, who pitched practically every day — had ever been used in so many important situations. In many ways, Hiller was the first “Fireman,” a term that gained much more popular usage in the 1970s. He was called to put out fires. And over the next decade or so, the fireman reined. Goose Gossage in 1975 was an extraordinary fireman. Bruce Sutter won the Cy Young in 1977 — he threw 107 innings and had a 6.5 WAR, which would have led the National League this year.

Jim Kern in 1979 for Texas … Doug Corbett for Minnesota in 1980 … Willie Hernandez in his 1984 MVP season … these were fireman. In 1983, Dan Quisenberry set the record with 26 saves pitching at least two innings. The next year, he had 27, which remains the record. Bill Campbell in 1977 had 11 THREE inning saves. Gene Garber (remember him?) had 13 career FOUR inning saves. Rollie Fingers got to the Hall of Fame as a fireman; he had 131 career multi-inning saves, which is the most ever. Lee Smith was a fireman early in his career (though he morphed later into a more modern closer) Kent Tekulve was a fireman. Sparky Lyle … Jeff Reardon … Gary Lavelle … Roger McDowell ..

So what happened? When talking about the modern closer, we’re talking about a pitcher who, with only rare exceptions, comes into the game to start the ninth inning when his team has a (relatively) small lead. That’s his job. Get three outs. The modern closer really began to gain acceptance in the late 1980s. Most people consider Tony La Russa to be the creator of the modern closer because of the way he used Dennis Eckersley in Oakland.

But, in truth, the true father of the idea might be, drumroll please, Pete Rose. Before 1987, no reliever in baseball history had even 20 one-inning saves in a season. But in 1987, Rose’s Cincinnati Reds had a dreadful starting pitching staff. And they had a 26-year-old John Franco. Rose decided to make him really the first modern-day closer — 25 of Franco’s 32 saves were the one-inning variety. That was basically unheard of.

By 1990, the one-inning reliever had arrived. That year, Dave Righetti had 32 one inning saves, a ridiculous total. But he was trumped by Chicago’s Bobby Thigpen, managed by Jeff Torborg. Thigpen utterly smashed the major league record for saves with 57. It was awesome enough that he finished fifth in the MVP voting. But 41 of those saves were one-inning saves. It turned out that one-inning saves were a lot easier to rack up than the old fireman saves.

And it went from there. In 1992, three pitchers had 25 or more one-inning saves. In 1993, it jumped to seven pitchers. By 1998, it was 11. In 2015, 18 different pitchers had 25 or more one-inning saves.

This list is revealing — percentage of saves that are exactly one inning:

1975: 16.1% (lowest percentage in modern baseball history — age of the fireman).

1985: 23.1% (about average for all years leading up to it).

1995: 63% (the age of the one-inning closer is upon us).

2005: 78.1% (the era of Mariano and Trevor).

2015: 84.2% (just down from the all-time high of 87.6% in 2013).

That’s how much of a copycat world we live in. But now, for the first time in thirty years, we see managers really questioning the wisdom of the one-inning closer. The percentage of one-inning saves has declined each of the last three years — not by much, but every little bit counts. And this playoffs is showing the power, at least in a short series, of breaking the chains and using your best reliever in multiple situation, in stretching him out, in challenging his limits.

Yes, some will say that it’s all well and good to break the chains in the playoffs but over a long season you need structure. Maybe. Some will say that over 162 games, pitchers need specific roles to succeed. Maybe. But perhaps we underestimate what modern closers can do. Perhaps we can look back, to the remarkable story of John Hiller. At some point during his crazy comeback, he was asked how he did it. And he said, “You never know what you can do until you’re given the chance.”

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30 Responses to Hiller and the Modern Closer

  1. Matt says:

    Loved this article. A few more notes about Billy Martin. First, Sparky Lyle won the AL Cy Young in 1977 under Billy’s usage. And on April 21 of that year he picked the lineup out of the hat. Won that game too. I’m hoping that the world is shifting back to that mode of reliever. A rules change to limit all the mid-inning pitching changes would be a huge help too.

    • SDG says:

      I agree. It never made sense to me why, if your game is tied or close in the seventh inning you would keep your best relief pitcher on the bench. Or why you would use a closer only to preserve leads, instead of holding the other team to as few runs as possible in a loss and letting your team try to score runs. Or to put in another way, during the last Yankee dynasty, after 2003 or so when Rivera was the only good pitcher they had, why did Torre and Girardi just stick to using him in “closer” situations instead of having him start? What did they have to lose?

      Personally, I think the next step is to eliminate the concept of starters. Split the game into three or 4 or 5 pitchers with no one pitching more than a few innings. It looks like that’s where we’re headed.

      Also, why ISN’T Billy Martin in the Hall? I mean, we have no way to really objectively judge manager quality, but the crieria seems to be have a high in percent and win a series and Martin has done both. (Plus, he was famous). But he hasn’t received serious consideration. Was it his rep for burning out pitchers? His profile is similar to Durocher’s, both his managing stats and public persona. And Durocher was considered a lock.

      • invitro says:

        “I agree. It never made sense to me why, if your game is tied or close in the seventh inning you would keep your best relief pitcher on the bench.” — I think the reason is because relief pitchers want it that way. They badly want to have determined roles and to pitch only in their role. The one-inning closer didn’t become dominant because of managers, it was because closers wanted to be used that way. That’s my feel, anyway. Even Sparky Lyle way back in Bronx Zoo was constantly complaining about how he wanted to be used in late-inning save situations only (of course, Martin used him all over the place). But it had to wait until a few closers got a pile of saves and Cy Young votes, then a pile of millions of dollars, then had the power to dictate how and when they would pitch.

      • Brian Schwartz says:

        Billy Martin was a great manager to have for one or two seasons. He never had sustained success in one place like Durocher. Martin managed every game like it was the World Series and burned out his players, which would lead to a down year. At that point he would get fired because he couldn’t get along with anybody well enough to keep his job when he wasn’t in first place. Durocher also has him by about 750 wins.

        • Marc Schneider says:

          I think you could say much the same about Durocher. He managed longer, but he frequently wore out his welcome pretty quickly.

        • SDG says:

          Durocher lost the 1969 pennant after a huge early lead because he refused to platoon and he burned out his pitchers, losing a ton of games in the homestretch. He said (in reference to something else), “Never save a pitcher for tomorrow. Tomorrow it may rain.” He also got fired a lot. Martin has a total win % of .553 (harder to get in the expansion era), Durocher’s is .540.

  2. Brian says:

    Great article. But you can’t jump from Franco in ’87 to righetti and thigpen in ’90 without mentioning Eck.

    • Joe Posnanski says:

      I was really surprised — Eck did not have 25-plus one-inning saves until 1992. I think his impact on the one-inning saved is actually overstated.

  3. doohan says:

    Every closer, and their agents, should donate 10% of their salaries to the guy who invented the save. Managers face pressure to only use closers so they can rack up some imaginary statistics.

  4. invitro says:

    “Terry Francona’s dazzling use of Cleveland’s super-reliever Andrew Miller in high-leverage middle inning situations.” — And right on time, he just pitched the 7th & 8th, allowing no baserunners, and getting five K’s, as the Indians go up 2-0!

    • SDG says:

      Toronto is going to take over Cleveland as the hapless losers of the sports world. Raptors have never won and probably never will, Leafs are just sad, despite being the most expensive team in the sport and the Jays can’t pull it off either. I wouldn’t be surprised if Cleveland swept. Also, the stadium looks like a giant toilet bowl and has artificial turf.

      • invitro says:

        Toronto should just be grateful that we allow them to play in two of our three top sports leagues. At least we make them play on fake grass and have dumb team nicknames.

        • Marc Schneider says:

          Isn’t Toronto’s stadium part of a complex with a hotel and there was a story about fans one day being able to see into a room and see the occupants having sex? If so, that’s something in their favor.

          • invitro says:

            Heh, I remember that story. I’m just being silly/stupid about Toronto. I even think it’s great that there’s at least one fake grass stadium left. Variety is a positive.

  5. Chris H says:

    I think Francona’s liberation may have come from realizing that he suddenly had two closers on his team – let’s be honest, if nothing else mattered, you’d almost certainly choose Andrew Miller as your closer over Cody Allen. Francona needed to figure out how to use them both, and to Miller’s credit, he didn’t insist on the spotlight. (Being the highest paid pitcher on the staff might help.) In turn, that gave Francona room to (a) protect Allen’s ego, and (b) get creative about how to use these two arms. So he started playing matchups in the regular season, and to a degree stumbled into the new strategy.

    (And on top of that, as Cleveland’s starters kept getting felled, Francona *had* to be creative about his bullpen. It’s been freaking bizarre watching them have “bullpen days” twice a week from mid-August til now.)

    In any case, it seems to be working – I would certainly say Miller is the MVP of the first five games of the postseason, if such a thing existed.

    Whether it makes for a better game is perhaps another thing. I hope never to see a six-pitcher inning myself.

    • Dave says:

      The facts contradict you:

      Before Cleveland traded for Miller, Allen went to the front office and said he’d be willing to step down as closer if they got Miller. After the trade, it was another day before Francona told both of them what their roles were.

      What’s been happening with this Cleveland team this season is something I have not seen in a while – they have one of the better offensive outfields even though there’s been six starters and 37 ABs from Bourn, their #2 starter in the playoffs (or #3 due to drone injury) started the season in the bullpen, they are up 2-0 even though all their offense so far has come from 3 batters….

      All of them, 25+, have simply bought into the “team” concept and play one game at a time. I’m sure there’s been other cases for this elsewhere (maybe even this season in Chicago) but as a Cleveland fan this is something I’ve never seen.

      • Chris H says:

        Thanks for the link. I didn’t mean to imply that Allen was going to be difficult, and I’m sorry if I did. The word “ego” could certainly suggest that. But Francona seems to have an uncanny ability to sense what his players need to be successful, and it’s certainly possible that, even if Allen was willing to step into a setup role, it might have been disruptive to his mindset in some way. I obviously don’t know him, and I’ll leave it at that.

        I certainly agree – I cannot recall teamwork like this on any team I can remember, Cleveland or otherwise. Maybe last year’s Royals. It has been remarkable, inspiring even, and certainly a joy to watch over the last several months.

    • Marc Schneider says:

      But I think the point is, if you had “firemen” pitching multiple innings, you would be less likely to have six-pitcher innings.

  6. KHAZAD says:

    Iam reprinting this comment from a recent article:

    I have noticed that in the three key games in the series that had some element of doubt in them, the manager that tried to get through an inning by playing the matchup game and using half their bullpen to get through a key inning had it blow up in their face, while the other team usually put their best arms out there and let it ride and were rewarded. This is something I have also noticed in the previous couple of years.

    Showalter, Bochy, and perennial offender Dusty Baker can watch the rest of the post season together, muttering about how the manager needs to get that left vs. lefty or righty vs. righty matchup while the other managers let their best pitchers decide the game.

    As a Royals fan, I only wish Bochy had stayed true to his nature in game 7 in 2014, instead of riding with Bumgarner. We could have won it twice.

  7. Peter says:

    Correct me if I’m wrong, but I seem to remember that Mo, despite being used mainly for single-inning saves, was often used in the postseason for multiple innings. Probably still to hold on to slim leads, rather than in tie situations, but still, the point is that Torre used him differently in the playoffs than in the regular season.

    • invitro says:

      I hope by Mo you mean Mariano Rivera. If by multiple innings you mean two innings, yes he did that a lot. He had 1.47 innings pitched per game in the postseason and 1.15 in the regular season. He didn’t come in before the 8th inning after 1996. It looks like he came in most often with a three or more run lead, next most often with a one-two run lead, then just to pitch out the final game of the season, then ties, then small deficits.

      I’d be surprised if many smart managers used their relievers in the postseason the same way as they did in the regular season. A lot of reliever innings in the regular season are made to give pitchers work, experience, a tryout. Those reasons don’t/shouldn’t happen in the postseason…

    • bob rittner says:

      In 2003, with the game tied, Torre brought Rivera in in the 9th inning and had him pitch 3 innings to finish the game.

      • SDG says:

        Sure. Because the game went into extra innings. They didn’t have a post-closer specialized extra-innings reliever whose job it is to save games in the tenth inning and beyond. (Yet. It’s coming).

        Although, you would think after Rivera did such a good job in that game, Torre and Girardi might have had him pitch multiple innings more often. Maybe even start a few games. I genuinely don’t get why, after Yankee pitching (except Rivera) fell off a cliff they didn’t move Rivera to the rotation. On the other hand, this is the braintrust that had the greatest SS since Honus Wagner move to third because Mr. True Yankee Face Of The Franchise was too much of a diva. (Allegedly).

    • Brian Schwartz says:

      Rivera was most valuable to the Yankees in 1996, used in the same role that the Indians are using Andrew Miller in now. He came in in the sixth, seventh, or eighth inning, and would shut the other team down until John Wetteland would come in in the ninth. What’s astounding is that everybody in baseball could see the great value of having a star reliever in that role – Rivera finished third in Cy Young voting – but nobody copied the idea for about 20 years and the Yankees abandoned it after the 1996 season.

      • nightfly says:

        I’m not sure if abandoned is the right word. John Wetteland signed with the Rangers as a free agent for the 1997 season, so they moved Rivera “up” into the closer’s role.

        It’s just hard to keep two ace relievers around for very long nowadays because they’ll both want to close.

        A while ago, I proposed turning all holds into saves, and keeping a separate tally of saves that ended games (along with a few other adjustments). A guy with 32 holds (often in high-leverage spots) isn’t going to grab attention – it sounds rather like he’s just giving out warm hugs to the other team – but “he saved the game 32 times and led the team” even if he was only used in the 7th and 8th and such, would look a whole lot better. Perhaps that would help baseball truly grasp their value.

  8. John Autin says:

    Joe, with all the old-school RP use this postseason, I’ve been waiting for someone to mention Hiller — thanks for delivering the goods!

    And for those who’d imagine the workload you wrote of would wear him out … Over the NEXT five years, Hiller averaged 112 IP and 2.68 ERA, placing 2nd to Goose in reliever WAR.

    • Dave Conley says:

      Thank you, thank you, thank you for an article on the criminally neglected John Hiller.

      IIRC, his 1974 season was a little less successful — he let enough inherited runners score that he ended up winning 17 games out of the bullpen.

  9. Brent says:

    So Billy Martin was a great manager, but as mentioned above, it was only for a couple seasons per team. He did burn out players, but more specifically he burned out pitchers. Rapidly. What he did to the A’s starters in the early 80s is well documented, but he had done that his whole managerial career. He probably shortened Catfish Hunter’s career. He definitely ruined Ed Figueroa. I don’t have time to go through all the starters whose careers he shortened or ended.

    Does that make him a HOFer? I am not so sure.

    • SDG says:

      The problem is we have no real way to quantify what makes a manager good vs lucky. The only metric we have to judge managers is wins, and it’s the GMs and owners who get the players, and the players who actually play. So how much to the managers affect the outcomes? Sometimes you get a manager who does something that revolutionises the game, like moving to the five man rotation, or developing a particular player who goes on to be great, but besides that, what do you judge a manager on? Do you just give in to everyone with a great record and assume they had something to do with it? Because until we come up with better ways to evaluate managers, the record is all we have.

      I’m not saying I like Billy Martin, but how do we judge him objectively?

      • invitro says:

        I agree with you. Bill James had a system where each team has an expected record before the season starts, and this is objectively calculated, and then we compare their actual record to the expected one. Presumably, good managers get more wins than expected from their teams. I don’t think this method caught on, though.

        I’d like to see someone assign a run value to bad tactical decisions (sac bunts and intentional walks, etc) and see which managers cost their teams a lot of runs this way.

        I think how a team plays late in the season may be a better reflection of manager quality than how they play early in the season. My reasoning is that late in the season, there’s a lot of data that the manager has, and he can either use that data well, or poorly. And that resting players some, and giving time to young and bench players and letting them develop, is a good thing to do. I don’t know if my reasoning is sound. But it’d be easy to check. I know Weaver’s teams tended to be great in September, and the Cubs tended to be poor then (because of the day games, I think), but that’s all.

        I wish I could get some more tuits and try these things myself! But alas, I’m even more interested in a better way to evaluate general managers and their staff, as I think those messy psychological factors might be less important.

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