Going For It
Posted: November 16th, 2009 | Filed under: Other Sports | 135 Comments »
Bill Belichick is famously unsentimental. That, really, is his legacy as a football coach. Herm Edwards shouted “You play to win the game!” but that was just fun talk. It is Belichick who has lived those words during his amazing career as a coach. He callously releases and trades away beloved players if he thinks it will help the team win. He benches quarterbacks if he thinks it will help the team win. He videotapes the opposition sidelines if he thinks it will help the team win. He has players change position, he has no use for stars, he tears up the team’s gameplan week after week and replaces it with a new gameplan, a specific gameplan that, like the prizes on “The Dating Game,” was chosen just for you.
This is what Belichick is all about: Winning football games without sentiment. Like Michael says in The Godfather, “It’s business.” If the Packers were about Lombardi’s pursuit of perfection, and the Steelers were about the Steel Curtain, and the 49ers were about the West Coast Offense … the Patriots are about business. They are about Tom Brady, I suppose, but they won their first Super Bowl when he was still learning, and their second when they had the best defense in the NFL (and a middling offense). They are about good team defense, I suppose, but they haven’t played truly great defense in a while. The truth is they’re about winning games. Whatever that takes. It’s business.
With that in mind, I fully understand Bill Belichick’s decision to go for it on 4th and 2 in Sunday’s night’s remarkable Patriots-Colts game. You already know the situation: The Patriots led by 6, they were deep in their own territory — the first down marker was at their own 30 — and there were just a few ticks more than two minutes left.
The conventional choice there is to punt. In fact, “conventional choice” does not begin to describe it. It was the obvious choice. The incontestable choice. I suspect 29 31 other NFL coaches would have punted there without even thinking twice about it. I suspect that had Belichick decided to punt there, nobody — not one interviewer, not one talk show host, not even one radio caller — would have second guessed him there (and anyone who would second guess him there would have been mocked and told to learn about football). I simply cannot remember any team going for it in a similar situation. You punt the ball and make Peyton Manning and the Colts go 70 yards to try and score the game-winning touchdown. It’s as obvious as bringing Mariano Rivera in the game in the 9th.
But … Belichick went for it. And here’s the reason: He doesn’t care about any of that stuff. He doesn’t care about sentiment or history or what every other coach would do. He doesn’t care about anything at all except winning the game. The best explanation I’ve read of the decision so far this morning comes from Brian Burke in the New York Times fifth down blog. Burke was a Navy pilot, and now he writes the Advanced NFL Stats blog.
His explanation is simply this: A team picks up fourth and two about 60 percent of the time — and we all know that a fourth down conversion in this case means certain victory. On the flip side: A team would score a game-winning touchdown from the 30 about 53 percent of the time. This leads to this formula — the first part is the 60% multiplied by 1 (1 signifying the certain victory if the play is converted). The second part is 40 percent multiplied by the chance of winning the game if the 4th down play fails:
(.60 *1) + (.40*(1-.53)) = 78.8% chance of winning.
There you go. Burke then estimates the chance of winning if Belichick punts — that is the chance of a team going 66 yards for a touchdown in the final two minutes. He says, historically, teams get that about 30% of the time. So a punt gives the Patriots a 70% chance of winning.
And there you go — 78.8% chance of winning vs. a 70% chance if you punt. It really is clear cut. I don’t know if Belichick plays with such percentages in his mind, but instinctively he knew that his team’s best chance to win was to go for it.
Now, you probably are saying here that the numbers do not sound all that authentic. The Peyton Manning Colts would have a much better than 53% chance of scoring from the 30 (and, as it played out, the Colts scored so easily and left so little time on the clock it seemed just about automatic). But, you have to figure that the Colts also had a much better than 30% chance of scoring had the Patriots punted — no doubt this was weighing on Belichick’s mind. And for that matter, you have to figure that Tom Brady has a better chance than 60% chance of converting on fourth down and two.
Really, no matter how you play with the numbers, it will come out about the same. Try it. There is almost no way — without suppressing the numbers — to make the percentages even out. The Patriots best PERCENTAGE chance was to go for it on fourth down. Of course, football is not really a percentage game for most of us, is it? No, it’s a game about emotion and passion and momentum. When the game ended and his gamble had failed, people lined up to bash Belichick — and normally I’d be all for this. Former Patriots player Rodney Harrison called it the worst coaching move Belichick had ever made. Former Patriots player Tedy Bruschi wrote that Belichick dissed his defense by not believing they could stop the Colts over 70 yards. Tony Dungy said, “You have to punt there. You just have to punt there.” And so on and so on.
But — and believe me, I’m not trying to defend Belichick’s last minute coaching here (more on this in a minute) — I think in many ways all these knocks sort of miss the point. This is who Bill Belichick is, who he has always been. He is about winning the game without passion or prejudice. He doesn’t give a damn if there were some hurt feelings on his defense. As we used to say in the old days: Tough noogies. He had no faith in his defense stopping Manning. And he coaches to win.*
*And come to think of it: Wasn’t he showing MORE faith in his defense by thinking they could stop Peyton Manning’s Colts from the 30-yard line?
Belichick also doesn’t give a damn that other coaches would have punted without question. What the hell do other coaches know? He has won three Super Bowls as a head coach, and he led a team to a 16-0 season, and he has the two longest winning streaks in NFL history (the Colts just tied for second-longest) and he knows his team better than anyone else, and he doesn’t care about that. He thought he had a good play, he has an unmatched sense of the rhythms of football. And he coaches to win.
To me, the better knock on Belichick is the way the Patriots wasted (utterly wasted) two timeouts in that final, fateful drive. They squandered the first timeout coming out of a change of possession — I suppose that was Brady’s timeout but it was awful. They wasted the second timeout just before the fourth down in order to be sure they had the right play and everyone was on the right page, which seems like a pretty intelligent thing to do.
But it wasn’t. When they blew their last timeout, they lost any chance they had to challenge the fourth down play. And as it turned out, the play could have been challenged. Brady completed a short pass to Kevin Faulk, who was just past the first-down line. But he bobbled the ball ever so slightly, and the referee marked him short. I still don’t know if that was a good mark. And I really don’t think a challenge there would have overturned the call … but it might have. As a coach, you have to give yourself some leverage in that situation. Belichick, of all people, should know that.
More to the point: The Patriots with two timeouts can still win the game even AFTER failing on fourth down, even IF the Colts score a touchdown. After all, that is Tom Brady. Give him 45 seconds and the ball, and he has a pretty good chance of getting the Patriots into field-goal range. The Colts were so panicked about giving Brady the ball back with any time left they spent much of their energy making sure they left little or no time on the clock — at one point it seemed like they had let too much time roll. As it turned out, they executed the plan brilliantly — scoring with 13 seconds left — but the Patriots with two timeouts (hell, even with one timeout) would have had so much more power. Frankly, I thought that when Joseph Addai rumbled 13 yards down to the 1-yard line with about a minute left, the Patriots’ best chance to win was to let him score the touchdown.
So I think Belichick coached lousy the last two minutes. But I also think the go-for-it call was vintage Bill Belichick. Sure, you could argue that, as it turned out, the call changed the whole dynamic of the Patriots. The defense now knows exactly what their coach thinks about them. The offense knows too. The loss puts the Patriots in danger of not getting a playoff bye — you do realize that if not for an utter fluke play against Denver, the Cincinnati Bengals would be 8-1 right now — and it creates some doubt in a head coach who has always seemed one step ahead of everybody else.
But, I would wager that Belichick does not give the slightest damn about any of that. He coached to win Sunday’s game. That’s all that mattered to him. That’s what the guy’s about. If he’s mad today, he’s mad for one reason only. He’s mad because they lost.
* * *
Quick Update: I was reading my colleague Peter King’s take on the Belichick call, and I think this is telling. He had this sentence in there:
Let’s place the odds of Brady getting two yards at 60, 65 percent. The odds of Manning going 72 yards to score a touchdown in less than two minutes … that’s maybe 35 percent.
So, Peter was giving the Patriots about a 60-65 percent chance of winning the game if they went for it, and about 65 percent chance of winning if they punted. So that’s about even, right? Of course, it’s not even because the Colts did not have a 100 percent chance of winning if the Patriots failed on fourth down — not even close to 100 percent chance. As we have discussed, there was a reasonable chance that the Patriots could keep them out of the end zone. And there was also a chance that the Colts would score too quickly and the Patriots would have time to score themselves.
So even though Peter compared the Belichick move to Grady Little’s Pedro follies — “I hated the call … it smacked of I’m-smarter-than-they-are hubris” — his own math suggests that the Patriots’ best chance to win the game was to go for it.
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Interesting take Joe. Well done as always.
Going for it on 4th and 2 was the right choice. Two passing plays on 3rd and 4th down was idiotic and those should have been running plays.
Great post, Joe. I am a huge Pats fan and I sincerely believe it was the right call going for it on 4th and 2.
Most coaches would have punted and then their defenses would have been blamed for giving up the inevitable touchdown. The Pats only realistic chance to hold on to the game was to hold on to the ball.
I wish they would have ran the ball up the gut on 3rd down instead of the pass play if they were supposing to go for a 4th down conversion. My main criticism is that they seemed very unorganized at the end of the game on both sides of the ball. Fatigue, perhaps, but the Colts had played the same game.
We just got conservative after Brady threw the pick in the end zone and Maroney’s fumble certainly didn’t help either. I believe Faulk got the first, but even with a challenge that call wasn’t getting overturned in Indy.
Although sarcastic kudos to NBC’s terrible ‘replays’ of the Faulk catch. Aren’t they supposed to have like 5,000 camera angles? What the heck?
You also have to take into account the intangibles here. This game is played by humans, not robots. By going for it, he also told his defense that he doesn’t think they can do their job.
FWIW, I think going for it was good, but the real mistake was wasting those timeouts.
Thank you. I will now continue to avoid everyone else.
I liked the call at the time, without having done the math.
I thought that the Pats got the first down, and none of the replays has convinced me otherwise. But they got a really bad spot. Unfortunately, as Joe points out, I doubt that any of the replays would changed the spot much, either.
I also thought that the last tackler should have let Addai score.
Sometimes, a good decision works out poorly. Sometimes, coaches do the right thing, even make the correct tough call, and still lose. That’s how football works, how sports work, and even how life works.
If I was shocked about anything, it was that the 4th and 2 play felt like how Herm Edwards would try to “be creative” about a 4th and 2.
To me, vintage Patriots would be to *act* like they’re going to throw short and hit someone deep middle. The Colts had just jumped the out on the previous play… they knew that their only chance to win this game was to hold the Pats to under 2 yards. They were going to be jumping every short route, bringing some heat, playing aggressively. Seeing a panicked 2-yard throw to a running back was not what I expected; I expected a double move.
I’ve seen so many teams punt on 4th and 1 near mid-field the last few weeks, or inside the other team’s 50, it is amazing. A punt is a turnover, with almost no chance of the punting team getting the ball. The stats are very clear, teams that go for it will score more points than they will give up, over a season. I hate punts. I really, really, really hate punts. I totally buy into the “don’t punt the ball” concept.
But I would have punted there. I know the numbers, but I would have punted there.
I also agree with your fundamental premise: one of the reasons the Pats win is that their coach isn’t afraid of the questions he’ll get after the game. He’s not worried about being 2nd guessed. He’s only worried about winning, and what it takes to win. Look at the Lions yesterday. 4th and 1 at mid-field, against a clearly superior team, and they punt. Why? What possible good can come of that decision?
Let your offense win the game. Kinda understandable if u got Brady et al.
I was really torn on that play. I HATE the risk-averse decision making that rules the NFL, where you choose strategy based on avoiding blame. So I was glad to see someone going against the grain. Plus I thought the percentages were about right, and I don’t like the Colts (Baltimore native).
On the other hand, I hate Belichick. So I was half rooting for it to backfire — the arrogant jerk! — but half rooting for it to work, since maybe it would be a small step toward a more aggressive league (as you know, the NFL is a Copycat League (TM)).
I suspect that, for the night, I was happy, but it hurts the game in the long run.
What Bryan said. As a Pats fan, Joe, this is the only write up on the move I could bring myself to read. Thanks for the clear-headed analysis.
Circle me, Ray Guy.
Joe, who are the two other coaches that would agree with him?
Hi Joe,
I am a long time reader and I really respect you for how great of a writer you are and I think this is just another great point by you.
Anyways, if you look at Bellicheck’s descions in the past he has gone for it many times on his own 40 yard line. Many people think the reason he does is because he has read the following Article by Prof. David Romer of Cal.
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/papers/PAPER_NFL_JULY05_FORWEB_CORRECTED.pdf
It was written in 2005 and is all about the fact that teams should go for it on 4th down. Romer is even more aggressive then other people I have seen. Prof. Wayne Winston of Indiana University wrote a book called “Mathletics” that talks about the matter too.
Again, I am not sure this was the right call because I really do not think that teams score from their own 30 70% with under 2 minutes left but who knows.
Thanks for bringing up this point though.
-Steve
Thanks, Joe, for noticing that Belichick actually increased his team’s chances for a win by making that decision. I cannot stand the Pats or Belichick, but that was absolutely the right decision. If you want emotional, non-logical decisions to be made, hire Herm Edwards.
Coaches in general are so incredibly conservative and they don’t put there teams in the best position to win way too much.
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Bill Belichick is being roundly criticized for taking a risk to win instead of safely following the book. Well, even Sarah Palin can write a book (sort of).
As a Pats fan, I fully support the decision by Belichick to go for it.
But as always, JoePos puts it much more eloquently than I could. Love your perspective Joe, thanks for sharing your thoughts w/us via JoeBlog.
THANK YOU!! All I’ve been hearing since that game was about how stupid Belicheck’s decision was. I know the guy has a stats dude right in his ear, who no doubt crunched the numbers and knew that the best possible chance to win was to go for it on 4th and 2. When I saw it, I thought it was a great idea. This is why I like the guy – if you fail on a play like that, everyone blames the coach – if you punt, they blame the players. In the end, the coach should be looking for the BEST POSSIBLE CHANCE TO WIN, and as Joe points out here, going for it almost always provides that. Even still, it’s kind of ridiculous to think the Pats still won’t make the playoffs at this point. They still may be the best team in the league (as much as I hate to say it)
I’m inclined to agree with you. I think you can absolutely support going for it, and I think BB made the right call. In fact, I’d argue he wasn’t unconventional enough!
Let’s play out the notion that they should have let Addai score from the 1. How do you do that? Pull the defenders to the back of the end zone and concede the TD? Would the Colts just run it in? Or would they take a knee (and put all their chips on a single goal-line play)? Maybe you should “pretend” to defend the play (so that they really do score and leave time on the clock)? Not sure how to execute it.
But you (and by “you” I mean JP) could argue that the bad coaching move was to defend them at all — it was a failure to fully commit to the “going for it” strategy. If you believe the Colts will score after a punt, you REALLY believe they’ll score after you fail to convert. So why not fully commit to “last one with the ball wins” strategy and actually try to actually be the last one with the ball?
THAT’s the business decision. Would have loved to see that.
My favorite point that I’ve seen made (and I hope Belichick made it to his own team) is that he didn’t show that he didn’t trust his defense to stop the Colts. Instead, he gave both his offense and his defense a chance to win that game.
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Horrible move going for it on the 30. That’s way too deep with not much time left to go for it. You punt the ball and trust your defense. Payton could have driven down the field, but at least make him go as many yards are you can.
The thing I hate the most about Belichick is that he is suck a sore loser and such an over the top winner. He creams someone 50-0 and he walks around the field for an hour after the game strutting, but he loses and he will hardly even shake the other coaches hand. No class 3 year old.
Didn’t the Colts have all 3 timeouts left and the 2-minute warning? How does making a first down seal the game in that case?
Seems like Manning was likely to get the ball back either way. Might as well not give it to him at the 30.
Otherwise, I agree with all anti-punt posts.
@ #8, #14: I remember hearing that as well, that teams were better off going for it on 4th down instead of punting it. I think what bugs me the most is when it’s 4th and short near midfield, but teams will almost always punt unless the distance is under 1 yard.
You can’t credit Belichick for making the gutsy calls when they succeed and then bash him when they don’t.
I agree completely that going for it was the right call. He had just watched his defense let Manning walk down the field on them. He had also watched his offense move the ball effectively during the game.
I find it fascinating that everyone always says something like, “Well now we know what he thinks of his defense” and wonders if any of their feelings are hurt, but nobody ever says, “Well now we know what he thinks of his offense” when they punt.
A co-worker who greatly disagreed with the decision said, “Well, I guess I’m just a Marty type of guy, more conservative”. Doesn’t this illustrate Joe’s point more. As great as Marty was, he’s got ZERO rings on his fingers, and Belichick has 3.
I agree with Mark S. (@2). I thought the decision to go for it was solid. However, the play-calling on 3rd and 4th down was more suspect. If the Patriots had already decided to go for it on 4th-and-short, then one of the plays should have been a run. It might have been stuffed, but at least the clock would continue to run (on 3rd down, at least). Or, alternatively, a play-action pass against a defense expecting the run. What didn’t make sense, at least to me, was throwing two short passes to the sidelines. So good decision, bad play-calling, at least in my (hindsight 20-20) opinion.
As to the bellyaching about the ruling about Faulk being short, that’s also on Belichick. The Pats wasted all of their timeouts — as Poz put it, you have no leverage of review. You then run a play that is designed to take you, at most, one step beyond the marker.
Officiating is a part of the game, and one of the constants of officiating is that they have a margin of error on spots of about a yard. Complaining about it doesn’t change it — if you’re a genius coach, you know your margin of error. If you’re so bold to go for it on 4th and 2 at the 28, then be bold enough to run a more than 3 yard pattern. When you’ve stripped yourself of challenges, make sure there is no doubt.
In any case, it was at most a toss-up. He did bobble the ball; with only a couple of badly angled replays available, there’s no way that call is getting overturned, and I’m not sure it should have been.
Excellent analysis, Joe.
I understood all the percentages last night as I watched the game, understood Belichick’s going for it on fourth down, and absolutely shouted at my television when they went to Dungy for his “analysis” at the end and he said that Belichick made the wrong call and should have punted because, “You’ve got to go with the percentages there.” Dungy had the right argument for the wrong conclusion.
Thanks, Joe, for being a voice of reason amongst all the mindless, conventional wisdom-worshipping drones who keep screeching for the punt.
My issue is that I don’t think Belichick made the decision to go for it on fourth until they didn’t pick it up on third down. I think if he’d had that mentality, you run the ball twice on third and fourth and you probably pick up your two yards on one (or both) of those plays. They’d been running that inside draw with Faulk out of the shotgun all night long and it was working perfectly.
I agree with his decision to go for it on fourth down, but he should’ve known what he was going to do if they didn’t get it on third.
Which pretty much confirms everything I said on your Facebook status last night: Great coaching decision, but he should have held onto his timeouts.
When you think about it, people that say Belichick should have punted are really not much different from Joe Morgan railing against people clogging the bases. They’re saying “I don’t care what the stats and the facts say– somehow I know better!”
Great stuff, Joe.
My colleague Chase Stuart at the pro-football-reference blog put up an analysis as well. (you can access the link in my name) Basically, at worst, this is a completely justifiable decision, and at best, it is the absolutely right call. Similar to your statement, you can play with the numbers all you want. There is no way that the Colts chances of scoring after a punt were significantly worse than half their chances of scoring from the 28, given the time and timeouts remaining. We all know that the the 30 yards in the middle of the field are easier to navigate than the 30 yards closest to the end zone where the defense doesn’t have to respect the deep ball.
Peter King’s right up is a fail. How can he get 2/3 of the formula basically right, but completely whiff on the third?
And for those saying that Belicheck lost his mind, or it was arrogance. No. This decision was entirely consistent with who he is, and he made it because he thought it was his best chance to win. He may be arrogant (what good coaches aren’t), but I’m sure he is not thinking, what makes me look like a genius. He is thinking, what gives me the best chance of winning–exchanging 40 yards of field position at midfield for a better than 50/50 shot out winning outright.
I agree that the math says the decision was very defendable.
One think I haven’t seen addressed here – if the Pats manage to make it back to Indy in the playoffs, psychologically, this loss may actually help them. After all, looking at it realistically, they dominated the Colts statistically. The Colts will remember that they won, the Pats will believe that they were the better team and will be tired of hearing about this game by then. Look for the Pats to beat the Colts if these teams match up again.
Math ain’t Peter King’s strong suit. Neither is staying away from the buffet line.
All I can say is if the receiver doesn’t bobble the ball, Belichick is a genius.
By any statistical analysis I’d have to agree that it was the right call. As pointed out by many, many people there were at least four other decisions made in the 4th quarter that deserve more criticism.
That said, I do think it will be fascinating to see how the Pats defense responds in future weeks to getting a vote of no confidence from their HC.
I do think there’s a longer-term value that’s hard to quantify in punting and challenging your defense to win the game. Football isn’t poker. Your suited jack-ten doesn’t care if you show no confidence in it and you fold. Football players do care.
Great post, as usual. One of the things that I love about sports (though as a fan it can be frustrating sometimes) is that a good decision often ends up going spectacularly badly, and vice versa, of course. As such, I can grudgingly respect Belichick for making a bold yet risky decision and, as a Pats-hater, take great pleasure at the failure of his strategy.
Great post, Joe.
I think you really nailed this one. It was highly unconventional and, as you stated, 31 other coaches in the NFL would not have had the guts to make that move. Sometimes you make the gutsy move, and it backfires, and that’s what happened.
The fallout this morning in the media (especially the Boston media) was all too predictable. You can’t come up short when challenging conventional wisdom and not expect the talking heads to keep quiet, or actually take a moment to analyze the decision in good faith. Instead, the Shaughnessy’s and King’s of the world are lining up for their piece of flesh, using words such as ‘indefensible’.
Apparently, at no point in their literary career were they ever made aware of the actual definition of the word ‘indefensible’.
I think you can argue for or against the call, and have some good points to make. I will always come down on the side of Belichick making the right decision to give his team the best chance of winning. However, I also respect that there is room for disagreement there.
To me, it was not that call that lost the game for them. It was, as you stated, the asinine use of timeouts and, I think more than anything, the ‘prevent you from winning’ defense they played on the Colts previous drive.
That is still the one area where I really think Belichick continually goes in the wrong direction. I never understood how you can play great, in your face, defense for an entire game and then, right when you really need to slow the other team down, you back off and play soft. The Patriots had been getting pretty good pressure all night and, besides that point, with the 2 safety mid to deep look they were playing, they were very unlikely to get beaten over the top (in fact, the Patriots have been one of the better teams this decade in not getting burnt on those type of plays).
To me, that was his unfathomable mistake; going to a semi-prevent in the waning minutes of the game. Keep the pressure on.
If you’re willing to take the ‘risk’ of losing the game by going for it on your own 28, up by 6, with just over two minutes to play, why wouldn’t you take the same risk by playing the same pressure defense you’d played all night?
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MA @ 24…the Colts were out of timeouts. That’s why a first down seals it.
Having said that, I get what you’re saying about the numbers, and I believe most teams should punt far less often than they do. you have 4 chances to make a 1st down, why use only 3? But in that situation, I do not think the numbers favor going for it. I could be persuaded otherwise, but I don’t see it.
The reason is that I think you are all both overestimating the Colts’ chances of coming all the way down the field if the Pats had punted, and underestimating the Colts chances of scoring from the 28 in that situation.
I think it was more like 50-50, at best, that the Colts would come down and score if the Pats had punted. Maybe even 60-40 against. Manning had been good not great, to that point and had thrown a couple of terrible passes. On the other hand, I think their chances of scoring from the 28 were something like 80%. (I agree the chances of the Pats getting the 1st down were roughly 60%).
If those are the numbers (50-50, 80 and 60), then how does it come out? Punt or go? Can someone run that? It seems to me those numbers would dictate punt. If they do indicate punt, then the entire decision turns on how well we’re really estimating the chances of all of these things.
Editor’s note: I think people were mostly saying that the Colts chance of scoring after a punt was 35-65. If you put it at 40-60, then the numbers would be just as stark, even if you increase the Colts chances to 80.
In your scenario, the Patriots percentage chance of winning if they went for it would be about 68%. But their chance of winning after a punt would only be 60%.
One thing that I’m not seeing anywhere is that the time left wasn’t factored into the math. Wouldn’t it lower the chances of scoring a touchdown on a 70 yard drive when there’s 2 minutes instead of 10?
I think the one item lacking is the game was not over if they get the first down. You have the two minute warning after the first down, so the clock stops at 2:00. The Colts still had one timeout left, so after the first down play, clock stops again. This leaves ~1:50 left. Run two more plays, and assume Pats don’t throw, and you can run another 80 seconds plus 10 for the plays. Leaves only 20 seconds if they don’t get a first down. Give them a 20% chance of getting a first down and the game is over. If they don’t get a first down, I would guess the chance of them scoring on either a punt return, punt block, or hail mary pass post possession change would be far less than 5%. The numbers point to him being better off statistically going for it. Yet I still couldn’t sleep last night and when I woke up this morning, I thought the decision reeked of hubris.
One thing I’d like to see is the probability that the Colts would have committed a hold or block in the back on a punt. They seem rather common and would add to the odds of the Colts not scoring if you punted it away.
It seems like a team holds on a punt about one out of three punts I see. But that’s a completely anecdotal.
I love how everyone always says they love the guy who is a real leader, isn’t afraid to spit in the face of conventional wisdom, make the bold moves, the tough decisions, etc. etc.
Until of course one of those moves doesn’t work out. Then the peanut gallery predictably cries out “OMG WHAT A MORON!” Hilarious.
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does that 30% chance to go 70 yards to score take into consideration that there were two minutes on the clock rather than (essentially) unlimited time (a la a third quarter drive)?
I have a feeling it doesn’t.
Editor’s note: It does.
Oops–I see now in the article that it does take that into consideration.
My bad.
I’m just glad he put the Colts in position for Reggie Wayne to get one more TD catch…’cause it meant my fantasy football team won by .62 points this weekend to keep me in 1st place
@Mikey #37
The sample size is small, but the last decision so widely questioned was the Switzer call in 1995. That lack of faith in the defense ultimately resulted in a Super Bowl, so, like I said, small sample size. Still won’t stop sportswriters from pontificating about the defense’s fragile psyche.
Personally, I wish Vermeil would have given more “votes of no confidence” to his defense, rather than continually lose games by putting the outcome in their hands.
I also don’t get the idea that these football players will be crushed. People like to compare football to war. Well, except its just a game. But let’s extend the analogy to risk taking and unconventionality, and the impact on troop morale.
Some of the best generals of history were risk takers who routinely defied conventional wisdom, and got troops to put their lives on the line doing things that might not have seemed manly or indicated a lack of faith in the soldier’s ability to win straight up.
General Washington wants us to cross the Delaware in the dead of night in the winter to sneak attack the Hessians! That’s a vote of no confidence for our troops and their ability to win a battle straight up!
Hannibal wants us to feign retreat in the center of the line at Cannae, retreat all the way to the river, while the flanks double envelop the Roman Army! We don’t retreat, particularly on purpose, that’s a vote of no confidence!
General Lee wants us to split our army, secretly march across the face of the opponent, and come out on the other side, what a vote of no confidence in the Army of Northern Virginia’s ability to beat the Union.
Football players need to play, and coaches need to make decisions that maximize their winning. But if some of the Patriots are troubled by a lack of confidence, I’m sure we can facilitate another trade to the Raiders. Cable will give you all the votes of confidence you need.
Belichick did ALMOST THE EXACT SAME THING a few weeks back at home against Atlanta. Check out the reaction then:
http://www.patriots.com/news/index.cfm?ac=generalnewsdetail&pid=39181&pcid=47
“Going for it on fourth down, deep in his own territory, head coach Bill Belichick sent a message to his team. And they responded.”
If my team had a 17-point lead in the fourth quarter and then the opponents suddenly cut it to six with 2:08 remaining… I may just think twice about punting the ball away myself.
I just posted this over on the Star’s website, so I apologize for the duplication.
My issue with Belichick is not with the specific decision to go for it on 4th-and-2; on the contrary, the math was in his favor.
My issue is two-fold:
1) The decision to throw the ball in that situation. Tom Brady is a terrific quarterback, but the odds that the Patriots get two yards on a pass play is no better than the odds they would have made two yards on the ground, and might have been worse.
2) Far more importantly, GIVEN THAT YOU’VE DECIDED THAT YOU’RE IN FOUR-DOWN TERRITORY, the decision to throw on 3rd-and-2 was even more baffling.
Put it this way: it’s 3rd-and-2, and you’ve got two chances to get two yards. In that situation, the odds that you get a first down by running twice are substantially higher than the odds that you get a first down in the air. Even a poor running play on 3rd-and-2 might get you a yard, whereas an incompletion gets you nothing.
Furthermore, running on 3rd down bleeds the clock, which is important, because with a timeout remaining and the 2-minute warning, a first-down there would NOT have iced the game – the Colts would have had two clock stoppages, so if the Patriots didn’t get another first down the Colts would have received the ball back with 20-30 seconds left. By running on 3rd down, the Patriots would have forced the Colts to either burn their timeout or let the clock run down to the 2-minute warning.
Which would have had the added benefit of preventing the Patriots from burning their OWN timeout prior to the fourth-down play, a time out which would have been awfully handy at game’s end.
I think Belichick benefits from the MSM outrage over this. 31 other NFL coaches are now scared to make an unconventional yet mathematically correct decision.
Rany, your commentary supposes that BB had decided before 3rd down to go for it on 4th. I encourage people to watch the replay of the circus on the Pats’ sideline after 3rd down. BB was sending on the punt team, and Brady wanted to go for it. Because of the confusion between them, Brady had to call timeout to convince BB to go for it. I think BB was planning to punt all along…. and Brady talked him out of it during the timeout (their last).
So before we give BB too much credit, we should understand that he wasn’t planning on going for it until after he was convinced. Sure, he only cares about winning, not perception, and he recognized that the strategy was correct once it was presented. But he didn’t think about going for it until well after 3rd down.
[...] This post was Twitted by jonahkeri [...]
Marty Schottenheimer just rolled over in his grave (Well, he would of if he was dead).
I never studied Probability & Statistics in college, and I’m constantly amazed at situations where ‘life’ seems to tell me one thing and math the opposite.
I’m not a complete idiot at math, but I admit that the formula in Joe’s post doesn’t exactly clarify the issue for me. I’m afraid there’s a significant proportion of sports fans that you will lose if you make an argument involving math at a level higher than arithmetic.
How many NFL coaching staffs really understand probability? How many MLB coaching staffs ignore advance statistics because it’s, you know, advanced statistics, and they didn’t get where they are by taking math classes when they had the chance.
Marty made the playoffs because he reduced his team’s chances of losing. (like guys with .OBP reduce their chances of getting out.)
Brady may have had a better than 60% chance of getting a first down, but the play ended up only having two results. A) Convert and win. B) Don’t convert and lose.
Belichick reduced his team’s chances of winning to a coin flip.
Most coaches have to be more risk-averse than Belichek, because he isn’t going to lose his job over last night’s game. Who else can say that if they made the same decision? Anyone? You think BB was crucified for making the decision, imagine if someone who is perceived as being a poor game manager had made the same decision. Imagine Norv Turner had made that decision. Or Andy Reid.
People kick themself for not having made a different decision when they catch bad beats in poker too. It’s flawed thinking and it’s very common.
A decision is only right or wrong at the time it’s made and going for it was the right decision if the goal is to win the game.
One more thing that Joe (and many others) have missed – there’s another scenario here, that the Colts get the TD and the Pats drive back for a winning FG. Not very likely but if the Colts scored with a minute remaining, there’s a decent chance Brady could have gotten into FG range. Which means that the Pats definitely should have just let Indy score once they got far enough. The more I look at the last 2 minutes of that game, the more I’m convinced that Belicheck really did blow that game, although going for it on 4th and 2 was not the reason why – going for it was absolutely the correct call and I don’t even think it’s close.
The Bill Belichich 4th and 2 calculator:
http://belichick-decision.heroku.com/
It was either really ballsy or really chickenshit, and since I hate Belichick I choose the latter.
Just because a decision doesn’t produce the desired outcome, it doesn’t necessarily follow that said decision was incorrect.
I can’t imagine any “human element” actually trumping the statistics here. Does anyone truly believe that the Pats defense is going to take the field next week and obsess that the coach doesn’t have any faith in them? Please.
The real disappointment here is that it will make coaches even that less likely to make the statistically sound choices in favor of those “safe” choices that will spare them from second guessing. Sort of like Boston’s failed experiment with the closer by committee a few years ago.
The prize that was chosen “especially for you” was on the Newlywed game. On the Dating Game, the prize was the date. You chose it yourself.
Q: Where was the most interesting place you’ve made love?
@Ryan # 59:
You’re kidding, right? That has to be a joke.
Firstly, that play did not only have two outcomes. The Patriots could have failed to convert and still won.
Secondly, even if it did only have two outcomes, that doesn’t mean it’s a “coin flip”. The two outcomes weren’t equally likely. Tomorrow, the world will either end, or it won’t end, but that doesn’t make them equally likely.
This whole bit about how BB was supposedly showing a lack of confidence in his defense just makes me giggle. I wonder how many people saying that ever actually played defense.
Look, as a defensive player, you certainly do enjoy holding the other team to secure a win; that’s because doing so means you were successful in your mission. But as much as defensive players enjoy that feeling, if their offense can see to it that they don’t have to hold the other team to secure the win, believe me, they’re perfectly freakin’ content to let the offense do their job. Especially if it’s a “workman’s” defense rather than a collection of egos wearing helmets, and the former does pretty much describe the Patriots.
Never mind the fact that, as Joe and some others have also pointed out, BB was showing faith in his defense, after a fashion; he was saying “I’m not worried about what happens if we fail to convert.” Hell, one could easily launch into a screed about how punting demonstrates a lack of faith in the defense and still have a legitimate point.
Brent – Arguably Reid twice decided to take the risk-averse route yesterday, kicking on 4th-and-1, the first time inches from the goal line. Because he went with the “safe” decision, the criticism is muted in comparison to Belichick. This despite that Philly is in a much more precarious playoff position.
@ BigSteve: What Joe presented was not Advanced Statistics…even in the most hyperbolic sense. Probability is essentially counting, e.g. what outcomes am I interested in divided by the total number of outcomes. Probability is basic arithmetic. I would suggest that 100% of NFL head coaches understand this.
@ Ryan: The play did not have two potential outcomes, it had three:
A) Convert and win.
B) Don’t convert then win.
C) Don’t convert then lose.
Which Belichick calculated to have more favorable outcomes than punting, which came down to:
A) Punt then win
B) Punt then lose
Silver lining in the failed 4th down conversion for the Pats is that other teams will continue to make the wrong decision here. Because of the MSM outrage over BB’ decision, no other coach is going to make an unconventional but mathematically correct decision in the near future.
I’m absolutely with those who pointed out the problem was passing, not running, on third down. The three outcomes on third down if you run are (a) you make it; (b) you don’t make it but Indy burns its last timeout;or (c) you don’t make it and the game clock goes down to the two-minute warning (yes, you can also fumble, but passes also get intercepted). All three of these outcomes are superb compared to an incomplete pass. And (b) and (c) put you in a significantly better position for the fourth down attempt, not requiring the use of your last timeout and possibly getting you a free booth review on any close play on fourth down, instead of burning the timeout and not having any review available at all.
Conclusion: Belichick was negligent before anyone was scrutinizing his moves. The move he was scrutinized for was correct, but he should never have let himself get into that position in the first place.
I wonder what Rodney Harrison would have said if they had converted 4th and 2. What a bunch of loudmouth know-nothings. If it works, you are a genius. If it doesn’t? WORST DECISION EVER. Hmmm… I wonder why I don’t watch ESPN or sports commentary anymore?
So many media types (and a commenter or two here I noticed) accusing Belichick of making the decision out of arrogance.
These people don’t know anything about anything, especially Bill Belichick. His decisions are about winning and because he doesn’t issue trite sound bites and kiss the taints of guys like Michael Wilbon and his useless friends and colleagues, he’s arrogant because he went for it on 4th and 2.
Well, here’s the thing. Maybe it is like the Grady Little thing in that the coach is being crucified for making the right call that just didn’t work out. Faulk makes the catch cleanly; they win the game and he is the hero. Similarly, Pedro broke Posada’s bat in half, but the bloop found the triangle between the middle infielders and the center fielder.
So Peter King could have been so completely wrong that he ended up right.
If any of you still doubt the move made mathematical sense, here’s a little back of the envelope calculation I mocked up. If we say that the Pats had a 60% chance of converting the 4th down (and most people are saying they had about a 60-65% chance), then the Colts would have had to been 2.5 times more likely to score from the 28 than from wherever a punt puts them for the punt to be the right move. That means if they had a 40% chance of scoring after the punt, they had to be guaranteed to score, i.e., have a 100% chance of scoring, from the 28 for the punt to be the right move. If they had a greater than 40% chance of scoring after the punt, the punt is *never* the right move. If they had a 30% chance of scoring after the punt (and most number crunching on this has suggested they had a higher chance), they still would have need to have a 75% or greater chance of scoring from the 28 for the punt to be the right move.
“His explanation is simply this: A team picks up fourth and two about 60 percent of the time”
I’d be curious to see the sample size on which this fact is based. The notes on Burke’s 4th down study say that the stats are based on non-preseason games from 2000 to 2008, and that they include only typical game situations, ie, no two-minute drills or bad-weather scenarios.
A sample of nine seasons includes 2403 regular and post-season games. I just wonder how many times teams have gone for it on 4th and 2 in situations that were not two-minute drills or lopsided scores.
Well, let’s say there was no such thing as a punt. Would a team see their average yard per play drop on 4th down? I mean, if they just ran their “average” play, teams get something over 3 yards a play. So, Mikey, I’d assume that if the sample size was a lot bigger, they’d actually make it about 60% of the time from 4th and 2, as that is less than the average play picks up. Or not. Since coaches are generally cowards, and like to decrease their chance of public ridicule, we’ll probably never know how this works at the pro level (though high schools that are starting to not punt are showing the math to hold up….).
I think you are dead on Joe. I agreed with the decision when it was made and was pretty shocked at the amount of criticism Belichick is taking over it. Hasn’t Tom Brady been in the discussion as the best QB ever? I’d trust Brady to get two yards over trusting my defense to prevent Manning getting 70 any day of the week. Another major assumption being made is that the punt is on average and the return is average. If New England’s punter shanks the punt it’s a whole other scenario. So I go back to what I said before, trust Brady over anyone else on that team.
A commenter on Burke’s site points out that the league-wide success rate on 3rd and 2 is 52%. This may be a better figure to use because it’s going to come from a much larger sample of plays and it’s likely to factor out prevent defense situations that you would find in 4th and 2 occurrences.
Also, there should be a small adjustment for the fact that a conversion on 4th and 2 doesn’t necessarily guarantee a win.
Burke also states “A punt from the 28 typically nets 38 yards” Okay. That’s an indoor/outdoor stat. What about in domes? Do we account for the fact that Hanson’s net average on the night was 44 yards, or that his net on two punts inside his own 40 was 53 yards? How would these figures change Indy’s likelihood of success?
What if we use the 52% 3rd and 2 rate as a better indicator in these circumstances and assume that a conversion actually gave the Pats a 98% chance of winning and not 100%?
(.52*.98)+(.48*.47)=73.5% chance of winning
Would punting indoors make up that remaining difference in WP?
It was a close call. That’s all. There’s as much knee-jerk groupthink on the web today as there was on TV last night. The numbers don’t prove anything conclusively.
The stats as you quote them ignore the possibility that the attempt fails,the Colts score but miss the PAT. Not a huge possibility but even if it just adds half a % to your figure,it still makes going for it even more attractive.
The math suggests that going for it provided a small increase in win%. Irrefutable. Statistically speaking, the right choice was made.
That being said, consider the decision from an emotional standpoint. In the moment, BB is not lacking confidence in his D, he’s expressing confidence in his O. BB made a call that, had it succeeded, would have won the game. Joe hits the nail on the head: BB goes for it to win. Other coaches punt so they don’t lose (or get blamed). As a player, I know who I’d rather play for (it should be self-explanatory).
“By going for it, he showed he doesn’t believe in the Defense to do its job.”
But by punting, wouldn’t you also be telling your Offense you don’t believe they can do their job?
I completely agree with Joe. I don’t fault the decision. The win was starring him in the face and the way the Pats moved the ball the “percentages” were in their favor.
The two timeouts used on that short drive were the abomination. Even considering the bobble, I don’t know that Faulk wasn’t on the 30. Maybe I was too tired and fatigued, but it sure looked like a review would’ve given the Pats a 1st down and the game.
I’m fine with the call. The blown timeouts were the true calamity.
Also, I loathe the Patriots and Tom “Derek Zoolander” Brady and wish them nothing but losses; however, bad officiating is bad officiating. Last nights two pass interference calls were, per usual, horrendous.
The league wants competitive games and big names on big market/money teams to win. Those two pass interference calls facilitated a close game and the league can always hide its agenda because the officials are inept geriatrics that constantly make horrible calls.
My buddies and I do a football pool, picking every game each week against the spread.
During one of the first couple weeks of the season, one of the guys in our pool, Robert, only picked three or four games correctly, leaving him in last place for the week by a fairly wide margin. Afterward, he told the rest of us that he had made the “right” picks, but the games just hadn’t gone the way they “should” have.
My buddy Steve smirked at him. “I usually think the ‘right’ pick is the one that covers the spread,” he replied.
I sort of think that way about coaching moves too. More importantly, if what you say about his personality and his take on winning are correct, I know that is how Bill Belichick must look at his coaching moves.
Sure, no matter what Belichick did, he could have lost, so you can’t really say any decision is wrong. That’s where playing the percentages comes in.
Still, I don’t think Bill would be that excited about you defending him in this way. You’re rationalizing his decision when the fact is, HE LOST. That’s all that matters.
Joaldo – You had me at “…sentimental”. Great post. The only thing better was watching the talking heads spit the conventional lines all day. It looked like Chris Berman was the only one I saw that might have read your post but he was hedging all the way.
I didn’t have a problem with the call at the time, and I am even more convinced now. When I realized the Pats were actually going for it, I was pumped. I thought back to the 2006 AFC title game when we had a 3rd and 4 with just over two minutes left that would have sent us to the SuperBowl. We didn’t convert, then punted. Peyton marched down the field on our flu-ridden defense and scored with ease. But hey, at least we “forced” him to cover more yards before he inevitably scored. At least we didn’t do something foolish like say, try to win the game with one manageable play.
The universal outrage is over the top. Talking about “giving” the Colts the ball at the 30 misses the point. He’s not supposed to get the ball at all. A better spot on the Faulk catch, and Peyton isn’t driving 30 yards, 70 yards, or even 99 yards. He’s standing on the sideline in a baseball cap watching Tom Brady kneel.
Nice points–
Peter King’s take was wrong on every level–
he even admits to thinking Belichick was using a time-out to advise Brady to hard count and…. call another time out. Two time outs in a row? Really? That’s what Peter King thought was going on?
” I was sure they were talking about trying to draw the Colts offside with a hard count; there was no way he’d be authorizing going for it on fourth down. But back went Brady tand started calling signals without the head-bob you normally associate with trying to draft a team offside.
I have worked with several statisticians in the past and I trust them only as far as I can throw them. The reason is that they can manipulate the data to make it say whatever they what. People without a math backround will then believe whatever they say because they do not know how to ask the right questions about how the data was gathered.
We have no idea what the probability of converting that 4th and 2 is because I doubt it has ever been done in that exact situation. The probability of converting in the situation last night was much lower than the historical average number because the defense has no reason at all to cover the deep pass and they had their entire defense at the line of scrimmage. Look at the conversion rate of 2nd and goal from the 1 yard line vs. 2nd and 1 from midfield. The both require 1 yard to convert but I would suspect the offensive conversion rate is much higher from midfield because the defense has no reason to sell out to stop the 1 yard gain.
I suspected immediately that Belicheck knew — either because he knew the odds or had an innate feel for them — that going for it was the right call. Was not surprised that everyone I read today who bothered to do actual analysis has concluded that Belicheck did the right thing. Was further not surprised that I have yet to hear anyone on tv agree with Belicheck. Am still sickened of the thought of the Vikings — if they could somehow make the Super Bowl in spite of Brad Childress — getting coached right off the field by Belicheck.
This game was just fantastic. So exciting, it lived up to the hype.
The 4th and 2 call was definitely all or nothing, I don’t mind the call Belichick made. I don’t think it was lack of confidence in his defense as much as more confidence in his offense. And it is Peyton, he would’ve went 65 yards as easy as he went the 30 or so.
Hope they meet again in the playoffs.
I don’t care what goofy statistic you want to try to use. That has to be one of the all time bonehead moves of all time.
Bob, that has to be one of the all time bonehead comments of all time.
At this point all that matters is seeding – there’s still a good chance the Pats get a first-round bye, as the Bengals are unlikely to continue to perform at this level and the Pats should get to 12-4. Clearly NE can go into Indy and win.
If this had happened in the playoffs then I could understand the (nonetheless incorrect) comparisons to Little and Buckner. Frankly his decision to go for the 4th and 17 in the Super Bowl 2 years ago bothered me more than this.
Love the reason on display here. Given how much money rides on each W/L in the NFL, it is spectacularly, phenomenally amazing to me how every team in the league, even the Pats (though much less than other teams), flaunt the convincing evidence that going for it more often increases your odds of winning.
On some level, this is like baseball ten years ago when nobody except a subset of fans realized the importance of OBP. One day there will be a mandate from an owner to go for it more – from an owner, so the coaching staff doesn’t get fired for doing what they should, given that it will fail sometime. And that owner’s team will win more often than they should, at least a little. And maybe soon everyone will catch on, and maybe “Billy Beane” will “write” a book about it…
I think I can guess who the next post will be about. His initials are Z.G.
Spud, I’ve been waiting for a Zane Grey post for quite some time…
Belichick has a history of going for it on 4th down in unconventional spots against the Colts. I remember a game in ‘05, when the Pats were injury plagued and their defense was pretty sorry. The Colts were undefeated and Manning was having a great season. The Colts were up 7-0 with about 8 minutes left in the 1st quarter. That’s the FIRST quarter. On 4th and 1 from the Indy 20 (i.e. automatic FG territory), the Pats went for it. They got the 1st down, and eventually tied it at 7-7. The announcers were baffled by this move at the time, I recall. But the reason Belichick went for it was because he knew they couldn’t stop the Colts over 4 quarters. As such, a FG wouldn’t do any good. The goal was to keep the ball out of Manning’s hands as long as possible and to score TDs, not FGs. It didn’t work. The Pats were on the verge of tying the game 14-14 at the end of the 1st half, but Corey Dillon fumbled inside the Indy 20, which then resulted in a quick Indy TD to make the score 21-7 at the half. Final score was 40-21. The moves Belichick makes may seem insane, but there is a method to his madness.
It should never have come down to such a critical play. Two goal line offensive mistakes, an interception and a running fumble, would have left NE with a very comfortable lead had either succeeded.
Burke’s reasoning is flawed… If Belichick would have ran the ball on third down like he should have, the Colts would have been forced to call a time out or wait for the two minute warning… Then Indianapolis would have either had less than two minutes with one timeout or two minutes with no timeouts… I like Peyton Manning and all, but Indianapolis’ offense ain’t what it used to be.
The only quibble I have with determining the percentages is that they have a 1, as in a certain victory, if the Pats get a first down. There is never a certainty. It may be close, but I think they have to adjust that figure down from 100% of the time the Pats would win. I don’t think that would change the calculation much unless the other percentages change.
As to the actual percentages, you can not just adjust them up or down by the same amount. The Colts scoring from the 30 may be able to do that 5% more than the average team, but they also may be able to score 20% more from close range than the average team. If someone has a blog dealing with advanced NFL stats, they should be able to dig a bit deeper.
A good example of using statistics to show how you can back any argument. The article strips out the context and never mentions the statistically variation. These would be my points for why this is too simplistic of an argument.
1. The 60% is a league wide average on 4th down and 2 outside the opposing team’s 20. Not the Patriots average. True that there are not enough data points within the Patriots to really know their percentage. Could be higher, but by no means can we be confident that it isn’t lower. There are many times teams, and specifically the Patriots, have gone for it when they might be outside the field goal range, and still only turn it over in the opposing teams side. This play was more akin to a goal line situation where the success rate is lower. In the latest quarter (4th Quarter) the following numbers if taken into account would likely impact people’s perception of the accuracy of those percentages created analysis of all teams.
* The Colts scored 21 points in the 4th Quarter to the Patriots 10. The Patriots 10 points is not bad but you have to realize without Welker’s run back to the Colts 7yd line and Peyton Manning interception that resulted in the Patiots field goal the Patriots were inept in the fourth quarter and could easily have had 0 points in the second half.
* The Colts offense was rolling and the Patriots defense and path rush evaporated in the 4th Quarter.
o Colts had 204 yds in offense in 4th Quarter
o Patriots had 65 yds. The Patriots were only 2/6 on third and 4th down conversion in the 4th Quarter. Granted some of the 3rd downs were longer than 2 yds, but you get the idea.
2. The 60% on 4th down and 2 when outside the 20 makes no mention of time left in a game. That may impact the likelihood of success as the pressure is dramatically higher.
3. Lastly the Patriots have a poor running game and do not have a great short yardage running back. I would like to see the stats for the league in that situation where a team is likely to throw in this situation (This point depends on the stats backing up that they throw more than the average team in this situation – I believe it is true, but not sure).
4. The colts have a great pass rushing team. Although stopped in the first half they were regularly pressuring Brady in the second half where the Patriots had great difficulty even getting first downs on any regular basis. The lone touchdown they got was mostly due to Welker’s return all the way to the Colts 7 yd line.
I think all this statistical nitpicking misses the point. I agreed with Belichick, but yes you can make a valid argument to punt the ball there.
The point is that these decisions are very debatable, yet airheads like Peter King and Trent Dilfer thing Belichick made some sort of insane blunder. The guy’s won 3 Super Bowls, he might know a thing or two.
Look at the conversion rate of 2nd and goal from the 1 yard line vs. 2nd and 1 from midfield. The both require 1 yard to convert but I would suspect the offensive conversion rate is much higher from midfield because the defense has no reason to sell out to stop the 1 yard gain.
The problem with this is that, while I know where you’re attempting to go with the analogy, the two situations are inherently different. Regardless of whether or not the Colts were ’selling out’ on the play, it’s still different than a 4th and 2 from the 2 yard line of the Colts, as they Colts do not have the back of the end zone as the 12th man.
Peter King is a great networker. He is not a very smart man.
I don’t know if the choice to go for it there was the right one, but I do know that the Lions would have punted 100% of the time given the same opportunity. For that reason, I side with Belichick.
@103 – I completely agree. Given the Pats history of 4th down success against the Colts, their offensive intelligence and talent, their offensive success that night (476 yards before that play), and the fact a 1st down virtually assures a win (or a punt with 20-30 seconds left and no Colts timeouts), it is a totally reasonable and logical play. There’s a very good chance they convert and win without allowing Manning an opportunity.
I believe the main reasons for such vitriol towards Belichick are 1) Some people look for reasons to criticize or tear down others, especially those who are successes and may be considered geniuses; and 2) Most people will look to convention even while overlooking logic. In this case punting is clearly conventional. People are calling punting the obvious choice even though going for it is absolutely reasonable.
If one of the best coaches ever and statistics show that going for it is reasonable and possibly the right choice how can the opposite be the obvious choice? The answer: It can’t and those that espouse that opinion either haven’t thought about it enough or are ignoramuses.
This circumstance, at its core, is debatable yet many talking heads like Trent Dilfer or Peter King think Belchick was wrong and/or an error. They just don’t have the foresight, hindsight, and/or balls to understand it was a risky calculated gamble made by a very smart man who thought it was the best play to give his team a win. Questionable: yes. Debatable: yes. Wrong: no.
And this whole “Belchick showed no confidence in his defense” is just moronic. He showed confidence in his offense to gain two yards. It isn’t about him not believing his defense can stop Manning. It’s that he believes his offense can put the defense in a position where they don’t have to and if there’s a very good chance you can end a game without trying to stop Peyton Manning, you take it.
People are finding out that punting the ball is almost like turning the ball over and gaining 20-30 yards. In this age, that is swallowed up in a play or two. More teams need to go for it on fourth down. I salute Belicheck for trying to win the game and not allow Peyton to put his mitts back on the ball. It didn’t work but it was the best thing to do IMHO.
Oh yeah, I agree….Peter King is not highly intelligent. Might be a nice man and a good networker as mentioned above but he’s never been anywhere near the mensa meetings. Neither have I but I try not to seem like an ‘expert’!
He’s upset now because some (actually most) people say ‘HIV virus’. How many people do you know who say the ‘HI virus’?
[...] • I don’t agree with everything Joe Posnanski writes here, but nonetheless it’s far and away the best analysis I’ve read on the Bill Belichick decision. [JoePosnanski.com] [...]
I love Peter King, who constantly writes holier-than-thou pieces riddled with tired, grotesque cliches and the kind of logic that comes from self-involved three year olds, admitting in his follow-up today that his own math favored going for it, but failing to apologize for his ‘hubris’ cheap shot.
Joe Posnanski referring to Peter King as a ‘colleague’ is equivalent to Gabriel Garcia Marquez referring to James Patterson as a colleague. I guess Joe and Peter do work for the same company though.
I happen to think the decision to go for it with a play they have precisely for that reason and rarely have used is a fine one.
In fact I agree with Tuesday morning QB author who says teams should use all 4 downs nearly all the time.
Still that doesn’t make the numbers that have been tossed out there accurate – FOR THAT SPECIFIC SITUATION.
First assigning a % for all 4th and 2 plays is just wrong – there are a whole raft of plays that are seriously unlikely to ever be called, like a long pass down field. Using the attempts to make 2 points after a touchdown is far superior, except that those numbers include failed 1 point attempts. I saw (somewhere) where a person took those out and stated that the success rate of real 2 point conversions was roughly 50%, meaning that 60% number is bogus.
Then there is the given condition of the teams as well as location on the field, time left in the game etc that all add variables. The 60% number is for ALL attempts, including early in the game with a 4th and 2 on the opponents 34 yard line, which carries much less stress than the actual situation I imagine.
Then there is the 30 odd % success for all teams at all times in all games when starting at their own 30. Another bogus comparison. Taking teams in the last 2 minutes of a half or game would be a better start to trying to assess a % and further adjusting it with the talent levels of the teams would be even better.
The fact is that this type of analysis can still be useful for the NFL but it isn’t nearly as reliable as it might be for MLB because the number of variables is so much greater.
Having watched Peyton play a LOT of games, it seems clear to me that he gets on rolls where he simply will not be stopped and said rolls can indeed happen during games where he was not that effective earlier. So I understand Bill’s desire to just win it without letting him have the ball.
The mistake was definitely the poor use of 2 timeouts that meant he couldn’t even try to challenge the spot and of course the failure to just control the ball in the first place.
Oh and just because I understand and accept the choice doesn’t mean I actually like Bill – not so much
The instinct of loss aversion is strong in us human beings. We’ll accept a far greater risk to avoid loss than to make an equal gain. It’s good to see someone overcome it. It’s the triumph of rational thought over fear.
Only a sports fan would describe a sports story written by an author trying to defend a losing decision as “eloquent.” This blog is not some great piece of English literature.
As it turns out, Bellicheat made the wrong decision because it backfired, plain and simple.
Well put, Joe.
Also, the bit about going for it being a slap in the defense’s face is hogwash too. If I were Belichick, I would tell my defense:
“I’m going for it here because if we make it, we win the game and if we don’t make it, I have faith that our defense will stop Peyton Manning from the 30.”
Anyways, it was the right call. It just didn’t work out. The football gods will make it right later on in the season.
I love the whining by Pats fans after this tough loss. I’ll be they took the day off work Monday to recoup, especially after losing to the hated Colts.
I’m not a fan of either team, but how can anyone possibly argue, sober mind you, that the Pats are the better team over the Colts. The Colts are undefeated, while the Pats lost to a very mediocre Broncos team and their offence was completely shut down by the Jets in a pitiful defeat. Best teams in football do not lose games to the Jets and Broncos of the NFL.
And, here on these comments u have Pats fans saying they won’t read anything that doesn’t agree with their own views.
What? That’s plain ludicrous and close-minded.
I feel sorry for Pats fans this week.
I’m glad it didn’t work out, I’m glad the Colts won and Belichick is taking the heat, but I have to admit you’ve convinced me that his decision makes perfect sense. The numbers don’t tell the whole story, but they support the feeling I think most of us had, that either of these top-2 quarterbacks would make the plays to win the game if given the opportunity.
Eh. Stats don’t lie, but statiticians do.
Belichick rolled the dice big time and lost. Accept it. If he succeeds, he’s a genius… if he fails, he’s a bum.
Today, he’s a bum.
why is it people jump to “Belichick had no confidence in his defense.” Perhaps he just had greater confidence in their offense and Tom Brady convert for 2 yards. How would you not?
[...] • I don’t agree with everything Joe Posnanski writes here, but nonetheless it’s far and away the best analysis I’ve read on the Bill Belichick decision. [JoePosnanski.com] [...]
What do you mean a first down for the Pats meant the game was over? A first down at the 2 minute warning when the Colts have one timeout left means if the Pats fail to get ANOTHER first down after already converting a 4th and 2 THEN the game is over. If they kneeled on it three times it would be something like -2 yards, 1:58 left and Colts Timeout, then -2 yards and 1:18 left, and then -2 yards and 38 seconds left. That would put them in another 4th and 16, or assuming Bellichick just takes the delay of game, that would put them at 4th and 21 around their own 24… and either forced to punt, run a Sam Wyche style sweep, or run back for the deliberate safety and hope to free kick far enough to keep the Colts out of the end zone? Those scenarios are all far worse than just doing the obvious, safe thing: PUNT! Not to mention I dominated this fantasy match because through the whole game, Bellichick and Brady continuously passed on obvious rushing downs and mismanaged their timeouts, which led to huge performances from IND DE Mathis and NE K Gostkowski (endless passes by NE on running down=Mathis sack/batted pass=lost yards=Gostkowski FG). This was a poor, poor game from Bellichick and anyone who thinks even remotely that his failure to punt has more to do with genius than flashbacks of his refusal to kick field goals for the entire 2007 season is nearly as sadly deluded as Bellichick himself.
http://www.advancednflstats.com/2009/11/belichick-4th-down-follow-up.html
For those interested, Burke did a follow up addressing some of the comments. Just so we are clear, the 30% figure Burke cites is actually time and score specific, all drives where a team must have a touchdown to tie or win (down by 4-8) points, with a first down around the own 32, with between 2:15 and 1:45 left on the clock. That is not a figure that includes drives from the 2nd quarter.
But I wanted to comment on a larger point I have seen on the coverage of this issue. For the most part, I’ve seen a roughly 50/50 split in online discussions, with virtually all of the comments reasonably civil and thoughtful, regardless of the view. Personally, I think it was a justifiable decision, as would the alternative have been.
But what I wanted to comment on was the state of professional sports journalism, as demonstrated by this event. I’ll admit, I read sport blogs a lot more than I read professional journalists these days, present blog company excluded. So I hadn’t really paid attention. But now I clearly see why Joe is considered one of the best in his industry, not that I had any doubt based just upon reading him. I don’t mean this to come across as damning with faint praise, so please do not take it that way.
But my word, is there some awful writing going on about this topic, cliched, not well thought out or presented, attempts at humor that are sophomoric, etc. And virtually all of it is by people paid by major networks or news outlets, not the “bloggers.” Honestly, if I read the word “hubris” one more time, I might spit. I just ran a google search of “Bill Belichick”, “fourth down” and “hubris” and got 1,420 hits (and I guess I’m adding to it). Virtually all of the ones on the first few pages are major outlet web addresses. Seriously, get a thesaurus and vary it a little. I know hubris sounds like a cool word, but a wider array of words would be nice.
If we ran a “Pepsi challenge” or “Taster’s Choice” type test, and asked people to view the writings anonymously, sampling articles written by journalists for publications on the one hand, and bloggers who do this as a hobby on the other, and then told them to identify which was written by professional journalists with ethics and integrity, and which were written by unprofessional bloggers who sit in their underwear in their mom’s basement, well the choices would be clear-cut.
And the results wouldn’t look good for the professionals.
[...] confidence in their defense,” isn’t this HAVING confidence in the offense? And as Joe Posnanski pointed out, isn’t potentially putting your defense on the field with a 30-yard stand ahead having MORE [...]
All I have to say is that the Bengals, as they are playing right now, could beat either of those teams. Just a much more complete team.
What you fail to consider: What is the percent chance of a team scoring a touchdown when they start a drive on the opponents’ 29 as to when they start a drive on their own 30? And then you have to factor in what is Peyton Manning’s percentage of leading a team to score a touchdown when he starts a drive on his opponents’ 29 vs his own 30? We saw all night they had trouble driving long; heck any team does — so many more things can happen: fumbled snap, INT, dropped pass, etc., can all kill drives. Your formula makes sense if we are talking about averages only on one equation. Sorry, but the Colts are way above average and there are many more equations that should be factored. Not so cerebral, Bill B., if you didn’t consider that. It was a boneheaded play in that situation. Period.
@Matt #121 – the game wouldn’t technically be over but they’d simply punt on the 4th down there and give the Colts the ball back with limited time left. Your numbers are close but not entirely correct in terms of the time it takes to run plays, so after all of the plays and the one timeout and the delay of game penalty and the punt the Colts would get the ball back around their own 30 or so with under 30 seconds left and no timeouts.
People can — and do — quibble with the exact percentages that the stat geeks have come up with, but they haven’t offered their own guesses about what the true percentages might be. To me: it’s two yards. I would guess there’s a 65 percent chance of converting those two yards. That the Pats failed doesn’t make me wrong — I didn’t say 100 percent.
Also, having argued this with a number of friends, one of the frequent fallacies is believing there’s a 100 percent chance that Manning scores from 30 yards out but the odds fall precipitously to (one smart friend said) 30 percent or so when it becomes a 60-yard field. That’s a preposterous argument to me.
This Pats’ loss reminded me of some of the tough losses the Colts suffered at the hands of the Pats in past years. I’d say the passing of the torch is complete. Manning is the new sheriff. Colts are the better team (that is unless the Pats beat them in the playoffs). As it stands now, only a fool would argue the Pats are the better team.
I agree with Bellicheat’s decision both based on percentages, and on the way the game had been played during the 4th quarter. However, if as a coach, you do not trust your running game to get those yards on 3rd or 4th down, it makes it much easier defense, since they can sit on the pass.
Also, the timeout use and decision to pass on both 3rd and 4th down suggest to me that Belichek didn’t think about going for it on 4th and 2, until it was already 4th down. If he had planned ahead to trust his offense in a 4th and short situation, a run on 3rd seems like the better and more likely play call.
You mention a couple of times in your analysis is that the game is over if they convert that 4th down. I would disagree as the Colts had 3 timeouts and the 2 minute warning left to stop the clock. Can you please add this into your equations?
I’m a Giants fan. The day the Giants beat those smug machine like Pats in the Super Bowl was one of my favorite sports related days of my life.
That said, the call on 4th and 2 gave me a whole new appreciation for Bellichek. He’s got dedication, daring, pride, pluck, spirit, grit, mettle, and G-U-T-S, *guts*. Why, Ted Striker’s got more guts in his little finger than most of us have in our large intestine, including the colon!
Bill Powell @85: You are confusing the *right* decision with the *winning* decision. These are not the same thing. The winning decision is the one that happens to succeed. The right decision is the one that has the greatest probability of succeeding.
Here’s an example. I pick a card out of a deck and you have to guess whether or not it is the seven of diamonds. The right decision is to guess, “no, it’s not the seven of diamonds.” Surprise! It’s the seven of diamonds! Does that mean you made the wrong guess? No, you made the right guess, it just happened to lose. It’s impossible to always make the winning decision, simply because it’s impossible to foresee the future.
Belichick’s decision was a losing one, but that doesn’t mean it was wrong. (Now, if he had had a crystal ball and knew that they wouldn’t make it on fourth down, *then* it would be a wrong decision.)
I’m stunned . . . stunned . . . that nobody is harping about the dreadfully bad fourth down call made by a Super Bowl winning head coach, which showed no faith in either his offense or defense, and directly cost his team a game.
Of course, I’m talking about Mike Tomlin’s decision to punt from the KC 38, and give up an outright chance to basically win the game in exchange for 18 yards.
A decision is only as good or bad as the result, or so I’ve heard. Yet no single media member has questioned the fact that he traded 18 yards and lost the game without ever getting the ball back? Where was Peter King this week?
[...] think his argument against not-punting, in this specific play, is stronger than, for example, Joe Posnanski’s and Gregg Easterbrook’s posts about the statistical analyses that generally supported [...]
[...] where close to (if not) a majority of sportswriters have supported the decision. Joe Posnanski was behind it (obvs…if he weren’t, I wouldn’t be), citing The New York Times’s statistics. Three of the [...]