Reliever Ratings 2008
Posted: November 6th, 2008 | Filed under: Baseball | 51 Comments »
One of the great things about being a voter on John Dewan’s Fielding Bible panel is I get my Bill James Handbook before it is sold into stores. I love getting stuff early. And, more, I love my Bill James Handbook. Every year they add some great new statistic like one that breaks down how managers do their jobs:
Least effective intentional walkers in 2008 (bomb reflects multiple runs scoring after the walk):
1. Ron Washington (Texas), 20 out of 44 bombed (45.4%)
2. Eric Wedge (Cleveland), 11 out of 28 bombed (39.2%)
3. Cito Gaston (Toronto), 6 out of 16 bombed (37.5%)
4. Bud Black (San Diego), 17 out of 61 bombed (27.9%)
5. Joe Maddon (Tampa Bay), 8 out of 29 bombed (27.6%)
6. Dave Trembley (Baltimore), 12 out of 44 bombed (27.2%)
7. Bobby Cox (Atlanta), 20 out of 80 bombed (25%)
The best intentional walker? Tony La Russa, of course. Only one out of 21 bombed.
The book will break down other things, like the best base runners:
The 2008 best baserunners, excluding stolen bases:*
This list would measure going the number of extra bases a runner gets going from first to third on a single (average runner makes it 27% of the time) second to home on a single (average runner makes it about 59% of the time), first to home on a double (average runner makes it 43% of the time) and also takes into account the extra bases picked up on wild pitches, passed balls, balks, sac flies:
1. Matt Holliday, +28
(Holliday was 15 for 26 going first to third which is amazingly good, 17 for 24 going second to home, 5 for 6 scoring on a double from first, and he took 23 bases, which is a lot. True, you could argue that Holliday is helped by the immense size of Coors Field, but really the guy’s an excellent baserunner).
2. Curtis Granderson, +27
3. Nate McLouth+27
(The Gold Glove was a farce, but he’s a really good ballplayer)
4. Kelly Johnson +26
5. Shin-Soo-Choo, +26
Every year, like I say, they add all sorts of fun new statistical additions to the the handbook. This year, they added a section called “21st Century Bullpen” which breaks down relievers and makes the very logical case that in today’s baseball, bullpen pitchers probably should be assigned positions since they do such very, very different jobs. We already have closers, and then we have a vague collection of set-up men, lefty-specialists, long-men, guys who you bring in to get double play grounders, bridges and so on. And we try to judge them all, more or less, on the same outdated statistics like ERA and won-loss record, and this is absurd.
Anyway, Bill has some real ideas about fixing that, and you HAVE to buy the book and read all about it. For today, I’m more concerned with something else Bill and the guys did: They took all the closers and broke up their their save opportunities into three simple categories:
1. Easy Save. This is a save when the first batter faced is not the tying or go-ahead run.
2. Tough save: This is a save when the tying or go ahead run is already on base when you take over.
3. Regular save: Everything else.
Simple enough. Here’s a little info on each type of save.
1. Easy save: This represents more than half — 58% to be exact — of all save opportunities. And last year all relievers were successful on 87% of their easy save opportunities. Remember, that’s ALL relievers — not just specified closers. People who you would describe as closers (pitchers who had more than 10 save opportunities last year) were actually successful about 92% of the time — or to put it in perspective, more often than almost any NBA player make free throws or field goal kickers make 30-yard field goals. A real closer should not blow easy saves.
2. Tough save: Almost never happens anymore — except with Mariano Rivera who was five-for-five in tough save opportunities last year.Most managers bring the closer in to start a clean ninth inning, so tough saves only happen about 5% of the time. And relievers finish them off about 22% of the time. Again, full-time closers do considerably better than that — they close out about 55% of tough saves.
3. Regular save. Most people would call a regular save a “tough” save because, in most cases it would mean starting the ninth inning with just a one-run lead. Regular saves make up 37% of all save opportunities, and all relievers close them out 57% of the time. Real closers finish them off 72.5% of the time — as they should since, for the most part, real closers get paid more money.
OK, so this is what we’re working with. So, naturally, I had to come up with an utterly meaningless formula to determine who is the best closer because, you know, that’s what I do. Using the percentages Bill offered, I figured out how many more (or fewer) saves a closer than a replacement closer. And then, using my utterly inept math skills, I came up with a CLOSER+ number that attempts to tell you how much better a closer is than average. The average, of course, is 100.
Here goes nothing:
Best closers in 2008 (20 or more save opportunities)
1. Mariano Rivera, Yankees
Expected saves: 27
Actual saves: 39
CLOSER+: 145
I’m was thinking about doing a bigger piece on Mariano Rivera — I’m fascinating by the guy’s ability to get people out for a decade and more with, essentially, one pitch. Plus, I have this theory that I’m working on that Rivera has been even more valuable than his reputation, but for a very odd reason. My thinking is this: Because Rivera has been SO good, there have been very, very, very, very few back pages of the New York Post or New York Daily News that read like this:
Down The River-a
Yankees Blow Game In Ninth
or
BOMBERS BOMBED
Mariano falters late and Pinstripers Lose Again
See, we all know that nothing sucks the life out of a fan base more than the local heroes blowing a late lead. I don’t know if it has a measurable effect on the team — I haven’t studied it — but it definitely seems to have an effect on the general atmosphere, the energy level, the manager’s enthusiasm, the talk radio tenor and so on. These things are multiplied in New York. And basically, in the case of Mariano, one guy has more or less eliminated that negativity from the equation.
I don’t know … just something I’ve been thinking about.
2. Brad Lidge, Phillies
Expected saves: 31
Actual saves: 41
CLOSER+: 132
I got the nicest call from Brad Lidge’s grandmother the other day. In this crazy business, you get all sorts of phone calls, from people who hate your guts, to people who love you, to people want something you don’t have (like free tickets or time with Tiger Woods). But then you get a nice call from Brad Lidge’s grandmother, and it’s just, you know, nice.
3. Jonathan Papelbon, Red Sox
Expected saves: 31
Actual saves: 41
CLOSER+: 129
The formula goes goes into fractions which is why Papelbon’s expected and actual saves are the same as Lidge’s but his CLOSER+ is a touch lower. At least I think that’s the reason. Papelbon was four for four in tough saves, which is much better than Lidge (who was not given a tough save opportunity all year). But he was just 15 for 20 on regular saves (while Lidge, of course, did not blow a save opportunity all year long).
4. Joakim Soria, Royals
Expected saves: 32
Actual saves: 42
CLOSER+: 128
I go back and forth, back and forth, back and forth on whether or not the Royals should try to make Soria a starter. I talk with one person who says they should and that makes sense to me for all the reasons you might expect:
– A great starter is much more valuable than a great closer.
– Soria came up as a starter and has multiple pitches and such an easy deliver that he seems a natural.
– Think about a Soria-Greinke-Meche rotation — that’s a pretty exciting thing. That, potentially anyway, could be up there with any team in baseball. Throw in a seemingly rejuvenated (or maybe just “juvenated”) Kyle Davies, and our beloved Banny, and the No. 1 pick of the 2006 draft, I mean, yeah, that would be exciting.
– If it doesn’t work for whatever reason, put him back.
– I get the sense — though he’s a tough guy to read — that Soria would like to be a starter.
So, I’m on that bandwagon. Then I talk to someone else who says there’s no way the Royals should make him a starter, and I find myself nodding — that makes too for all the reasons you might expect:
– Soria is already a dominant closer and there’s no telling how he would be as a starter. You don’t fool with one of the few things you have done right in a decade.
– There are very, very, very, very few examples of a guy who begins his career as dominant closer being made into a dominant starter. In fact, when I went back to try and find one, I pretty much rolled snake eyes.
– If he fails as a starter, you may ruin him as a closer too. You may not, but there’s always a risk. Part of Soria’s brilliance seems to be that he feels invincible. You would hate to mess with that.
– There’s a great feeling in the clubhouse with Soria closing things out — everyone knows that if they get to the late innings with a lead they will almost certainly win. You would hate to mess with that either.
– Who would close? Hochevar? Ram Ram? Jeff Montgomery?
Both of these line of thinking make some sense to me. So, in the end, where do I come down? I would say that at this moment, if I’m playing with someone else’s money, yeah, I would at least try to make Soria a starter. I think it would have an excellent chance of working, and I think if it didn’t work for some reason I think he would be able to regain his dominance in the pen. Plus … I’m serious, how can you not get excited about a Soria-Greinke-Meche top three?
Of course, I could be convinced otherwise.
5. C.J. Wilson, Texas
Expected saves: 19
Actual saves: 24
CLOSER+: 126
6. Brian Wilson, San Francisco
Expected Saves 33
Actual saves: 41
CLOSER+: 125
Lyin’ in bed just like Brian Wilson did
Well I am …
Lyin’ in bed just like Brian Wilson did
So I’m a-lying here, just staring at the ceiling tiles
and I’m thinking about, oh, what to think about
Just listening and relistening to Smiley Smile
And I’m wondering if this some kind of creative drought
7. Joe Nathan, Twins
Expected saves: 31
Actual saves: 39
CLOSER+: 124
8. Bobby Jenks, White Sox
Expected saves: 24
Actual Saves: 30
CLOSER+: 122
9. K-Rod, Angels
Expected saves: 52
Actual saves: 62
CLOSER+ 119
He had one tough save all year — which he converted — and he was slightly better than the average closer on the easy and regular saves. I’m not sure how other relievers would have handled 69 save opportunities from a mental standpoint. And it’s significant that he pitched on consecutive days 29 times, more than any other closer. But from a pure pitching quality standpoint, I think there are about probably 10 to 15 other pitchers who, given the same opportunities as K-Rod, would have smashed the save record last year.
10. Brian Fuentes
Expected saves: 25
Actual saves: 30
CLOSER+: 119
And a quick list of worst closers, 20 or more opportunities:
Worst: J.J. Putz, Seattle
Expected saves: 16
Actual saves: 15
CLOSER+: 94
The CLOSER+ number is a bit misleading because a 100 closer is actually pretty lousy. The number 100 comes from the average of ALL relievers, not just closers. An average “closer” is actually closer to 115. If that makes any sense at all. Which I’m sure it doesn’t.
Other struggling closers in 2008: Billy Wagner (100 CLOSER+), Ryan Franklin (100 CLOSER+) and Jonathan Broxton (103 CLOSER+).
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Give us the whole list, Joe!
Oh, and by the way, you’re right about blowing late leads sucking the energy out of a fan base.
The Browns are sucking my will to live.
“– There are very, very, very, very few examples of a guy who begins his career as dominant closer being made into a dominant starter. In fact, when I went back to try and find one, I pretty much rolled snake eyes.”
What about Adam Wainwright? He’s the only one that comes to mind…
You’re right Joe. Anyone remember this gem. http://joeposnanski.com/JoeBlog/2008/05/28/the-moment-before-the-pain/
That was the best Bare Naked Ladies album, in my humble opinion. One of my twenty favorite CDs of all time. Thank you for that.
– There are very, very, very, very few examples of a guy who begins his career as dominant closer being made into a dominant starter. In fact, when I went back to try and find one, I pretty much rolled snake eyes.
Derek Lowe dude!
(well, he was a failed starter for a bit before becoming a dominant closer…but so was Wainwright, a starter in the minors at least)
Derek Lowe had one dominant season as a closer (2000) before moving into the starting rotation and having one dominant season (2002) and a bunch of very good seasons there. Hey, you didn’t say anything about sustained dominance.
“Brian Wilson” – great song by a great band. My favorite version is the live one on Rock Spectacle. If it wasn’t for the fact that I have Bush’s “Sixteen Stone” playing on iTunes, it would probably be stuck in my head right now.
As my fantasy team could tell you, the Wilsons were nowhere near close to being the fifth and sixth best closers in baseball. Heck, CJ even lost his job.
Well, Curt Schilling was converted from a starter to a middle reliever to a closer to a long reliever to a starter (and then to a closer and a starter again), but he wasn’t exactly dominant at much of anything for a long time…
(that’s probably not what you were looking for)
Not “dominant” perhaps, but Charlie Hough had 22 saves for the pennant-winning 1977 Dodgers and then enjoyed a fine career for a starter, at least as fine as it could be pitching for mostly bad Texas teams.
Rivera (who had Tommy John surgery before he made it to the show) did start a few games in ‘94 or ‘95. The Yankees obviously made the right decision with him.
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Hoyt Wilhelm was a brilliant ace reliever (before there was such a thing as a closer) for several years. He was made a starter (more or less) in 1959, and was brilliant. Then he was put back in a reliever/swingman role in 1960. Of course, he was a knuckleballer, and a HoFer, so he’s magnificently atypical.
After seeing him dominate in the bullpen as a 23-year-old, the White Sox tried to make Goose Gossage into a starter the next year. After seeing him be a below-average starter for a year, they moved him back to the pen, and the rest is hall of fame, I mean history.
Supernatural Santana started as a reliever (though not a closer), but as it became apparent how good he was, he was moved to the rotation.
So, in my brief memory and briefer search, I don’t see any resounding closer-to-starter success stories. (Unless John Smoltz counts, and I’d guess that he doesn’t.)
Closer is worth watching only because Natalie Portman will quicken your pulse and make your heart stop at the same time if that’s possible. Hotter than hot.
Perhaps if the Royals move Soria into the starting rotation, they can move Tony Pena Jr. permanently into the closer’s spot? It’s clearly the role he was born to play (in that he would hopefully never be required to touch a bat).
Joba wasn’t a closer, but he’s been a dominant setup man and has flourished as a starter, but it’s still too early to see how he progresses.
Make him a starter. With a team that’s been as lousy as KC has, a closer is the last thing you need to worry about. They need to work on just getting to the ninth inning with the lead.
People love to say Rivera only throws one pitch, but he throws a cutter, a two-seamer, and a four-seamer — all of which move in markedly different ways. The batter can’t count on the ball breaking in a certain way. I always think of him as having three pitches.
How about John Smoltz? Dominant starter, dominant closer, dominant starter…
It was nice to see Brad Lidge get his career back on track this year.
Joe Torre always said that the best part of being a manager with Mariano at the end of the game was that he removed the words “walk-off homer” from baseball’s vocabulary.
My favorite Mo moment is still the 8th inning of Game 6 in the 1996 World Series when he came in, retired the side, and took the longest walk back to the dugout, just relishing every moment.
Joe I know you did not claim your formula to be perfect but come on – was this “forumla” created to bait Sabermetricians? No consideration for base runners allowed, stranded runners, strike outs, walks… …I could go on. The mere fact that Jonathan Broxton appeared at the botttom of the list kind of exposes the formula – imo. Broxton and Lidge’s numbers were nearly identical – the only thing that separated them was their ERA – their expected ERA’s were 3.14 (Broxton) and 3.25. Just sayin…
Wish there was an edit post option here… I think I got stuck taking the bait… doh!
Bobby Cox intentionally walked 80 batters this year?!? That is absolutely crazy. That is just about one intentional pass every other game.
For an organization that has prided itself on dominant pitching for the past decade, that number doesn’t really show much confidence in their pitching staff.
On another note, I am so excited by the prospect that K-Rod will no longer be in an Angel’s uniform. The guy definitely has passion – I’ll give him that – but the fact that he is incredibly inefficient with his command and that his arm will probably blow out in the next year as a result of his awful mechanics makes him a huge liability.
Not to mention the near heart-attacks I get every time he steps on the mound because of his apparent inability to have an easy, 1-2-3 inning.
i would think that if you subscribe to the theory that closer is just a good reliever, then its happened many times. And is probably the preferred path for most pitchers, the fact that Soria handled the 9th instead of the 7th or 8th just makes it more likely that he’ll handle it.
Glad we’ve made it back on topic.
Joe, often a closer is a closer because he failed as a starter first.
What’s odd about the Soria situation is the Royals never game him the chance to fail as a starter, and, combined with the Rule 5 situation and the Dotel trade, he ended up being “handed” the closer’s role before he ever got a chance to start. I believe this is more an indictment of the Royals player development system as anything, and if Soria made it to the bigs on ANY other team, he would have been eased in as a long reliever (a la Johan Santana), and when it became apparent how good he was, moved to the rotation (a la Santana as well).
Royals are victims of Soria’s success (and their own lousy farm system), in that it blinded them to considering other, more valuable uses for him.
Personally, I think Ramon Ramirez would make a decent closer, and I believe a franchise like the Royals can’t afford to follow the rest of the sheep in baseball and leave Soria as the closer. They should be LOOKING for ways to think outside the box, and moving Soria to the rotation would be one EXCELLENT place to start doing that.
I think the difference between Soria and guys like Wainwright and Lowe is that the latter two have ALWAYS been starters. Both got their feet wet in the pen in the majors, but they were starters throughout their minor league careers. Soria had some starting experience in the Mexican League, but it appears he’s mostly relieved. Still, if he has a deep repertoire of plus pitches that can mess with a hitter’s timing and eye level, then I think you kinda HAVE to try him in the rotation.
On the issue of stats, I think anything comparing save percentages of closers and non-closers is necessarily a bit problematic. As a Jays’ fan, I know that if Shawn Camp gets called in to start the sixth inning of an 8-5 game, he’s not still going to be around in the ninth to close it out. If he gives up three runs, though, he still gets credited with a blown save. With bullpen roles becoming more and more defined all the time, with everyone having their set role and managers’ game plans becoming more and more set in stone, there’s no reason for anyone to assume that he was in a true “save situation” there.
It always baffles me when a team switches closers mid-stream and some baseball “expert” points out that the setup guy who was promoted to the closer’s role is only 3-for-11 lifetime in saving games. What they neglect to realize is that maybe only three or four of those save chances were actual save chances.
I think the concept of a blown hold might not be a bad idea, though I think the hold rule needs some revamping, too. As it stands, if Camp came into the aforementioned game situation, gave up two solo bombs and then was yanked without getting any outs, he’d still get a hold. To my way of thinking, a pitcher should have to do SOMETHING positive to get credited with a hold. Otherwise, it has no real value as a stat.
Re: Soria as a closer, thank Xenu you came down on the side of the angels, Joe. I couldn’t stand it if you came down in the camp of the immortal Dick Kaegel, i.e.,
Mr. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!!!111″
Making Soria a starter is risky. Leaving him as a closer is not.
Much in the same spirit as Herm Edwards being GRATEFUL that he did not have a chance to draft Matt Ryan because of the risk associated with taking a QB with your first pick, I think the Royals are a little paralyzed by the risk. Not moving Soria is, on the surface, risk-free because the downside of leaving him in place is hypothetical. (He might be a great starter…but we can’t prove conclusively that we are missing out on his great-starter-ness if he doesn’t try it.) And, frankly, in the baby-steps world of the Royals, I don’t blame them. The Royals actually have a legitimate All Star in Soria as a closer.
Now, all of that being said, if we are really limited to 60 million for 2009 (Allard Baird is LAUGHING at you, Dayton), then perhaps Soria to the rotation is the only legitimate way to improve the staff.
I’m with Marco – blowing leads is teh suq. I’m an Islanders fan… they’ve blown three-goal leads TWICE and a two-goal lead just last night – to the THRASHERS of all teams. They did manage to scrape the win against Columbus but they never should have needed OT to do it.
Sadly, it’s too early to crack a beer.
Awesome stuff Joe. What book am I supposed to buy?
Yours or Bill James?
Hell, I love Mo and I’m a Sox fan. That guy is old-school cool. As a certified Manny apologist (Card #1024), it is really going to suck watching Manny play for the Yankess next year, though.
Also, Putz was dominating in 2007 but was never right physically last year. He will dominate again assuming good health.
Soria as a starter… YES WE CAN!
When was Natalie Portman ever on ‘The Closer’?
PS – Justin, I’m with you. I would scrap holds.
Since they’re save situations I would simply call them saves. You would be able to accumulate more than one in a game, if a series of relievers all preserved the lead. Closers, who make the last save of the game, could get both the save and something else called the “close” or the “finish” or some such – though the more I think about that, the more I suspect that it’s unnecessary. They haven’t done anything different than the other guys. In fact, as Joe’s tinkering demonstrates, they may have done less, since they are usually not used in as many “tough save” situations as their teammates. The “save” with the go-ahead runs on in the seventh and no-one out is higher leverage than the perfect ninth with a three-run gap. (I’d probably eliminate that last as a save, actually. You have to face the tying run to qualify. AND if you give up a run to face the tying run, you don’t get a save for wriggling out of it afterward. There is no reward for making your team’s job any harder.)
While I was at it, I would charge relievers with inherited runs they let score from first, not the guy who put them on. If they’re not in scoring position, you should be expected to keep them from crossing home plate.
Finally I’d put in a vulture rule – relievers who blow saves are ineligible for wins.
(I’d give it to the next pitcher of record if someone else pitches while tied or behind; or if the team re-takes the lead before anyone else pitches, then the win would go back to the person who last pitched with it. So if JJ Putz gacks it in the top of the ninth, but somehow the Mariners win in the bottom of the inning, then the guy BEFORE Putz keeps his win. If it’s Feliciano spitting the bit in the seventh, and Duaner Sanchez keeps it close before the Mets rally, then Sanchez gets it. But that’s of course open to debate, it may be simpler to always send the win back – so Maine or whatever would win in the second scenario. In any case Sanchez could not get a save because he didn’t pitch with a lead.)
I tend to agree with Devil-Fingers, Glen and others that you got to keep him as a closer. But this is coming from a Red Sox fan P.O.V. where a dominant closer is essential in the playoffs. Of course you need the strong SP’s but as the Rays proved, it makes things more difficult without a lock-down guy in the late innings. (They were grateful / lucky for having Price there and perform as well as he did. W/out Price, not sure they get past the Sox) However, moving Soria to the rotation may give the Royals who knows – 7-12 more wins, which could result in a winning season, which I would imagine, would make the move a tremendous success. So, for the Royals in this day and time right now – I completely see moving him, or at least giving it a shot.
Don’t let LaRussa read that IBB stat or his head won’t even fit in Kevin Mench’s cap………assuming it would now.
Joe…what do Todd Jones’ numbers look like for this or any other year? I always maintained that he wasn’t as bad as most Tiger fans made him out to be (I think I might have been his biggest defender, as scary as that is), but I feel like he let me down on that this year. Throw some numbers at me if you can, please!
Joe, I’d leave the math skills to the mathematicians … C.J. Wilson was the 5th-best closer in the game this season?!? He had a **6.02 ERA** for crying out loud! With due respect, I must say that your CLOSER+ stat should never see the light of day.
He might have been 24-28 in save ops, but trust me – by actually watching the Rangers play all season, there were plenty of games where he and Joaquin Benoit would enter a game late holding a 5- or 6- or 11-run lead (NON-save op), and the Rangers would lose yet again.
This also explains why Ron Washington shows up on top of the “Bombed IBB” list. I really couldn’t say it’s because he’s a bad manager or is making the wrong decisions – his pitchers simply can’t get anybody out.
Just for the record, Justyo, I was saying the opposite… gotta try him as a starter.
Kind of funny to see Billy Wagner on the bottom of the list. Phillie fans were upset when he left.. Who’s gonna close now!!?? (Flash Gordon!)
So the Phils go get Lidge. Maybe they knew something, maybe they just got lucky, but Imagine how different 2008 is for the Phils with Wagner out of the pen instead of Lidge.
Joe…did you crunch any historical #s on this? Seems the tough save # weighs heavily in this mix…yet the tough save # probably wavers significantly year to year. Be interesting to see a three year spread on this. Very cool nonetheless…
other dominant closers to become top starters for awhile:
Wilbur Wood
Dean Chance
Interrupting for a moment with baserunners — is there anything more annoying than watching the ball bounce into the stands for a ground-rule double just as the runner from first is heading for third and ultimately home?
I’d like to see a rule change that gives the batter two bases but the man on first three. Or maybe draw a line on the centre-field wall and make anything right of that a triple for the runner.
Thank you. Back to closers.
I agree that starters are more valuable than closers, but if the Royals move Soria we would have to have someone just as good to close. Giving up a lead in the 9th and losing is very painful, so finally having a good closer was really nice last year.
A big concern of mine with making him a starter is all the trouble he had with fatigue last year. He didn’t pitch for like a week (can’t remember specifically how many games) because of fatigue. They also rarely ever brought him in before the 9th to save him as well. If he is a starter how many innings can he go.
Right now I want him to stay a closer.
Love the baserunning stat. I would like to see those bases and stolen bases added to total bases and call it something like “baserunning-added total bases”.
Leave Soria in the pen and closer is a position of strength. Take him out, and it may not be, and there is no guarantee he will be a successful starter. Leave a good thing alone.
Then again, I tend to overvalue closers. I firmly believe that the Yanks would be better off leaving Joba in the pen, setting up Mo one more year, then taking over as a full-time (and utterly dominant) closer. There is nothing more demoralizing to an opponent than knowing the game is 7 innings long, and with Joba in the 8th and Rivera in the 9th, that is what it would be. The game has become that specialized.
With the increased awareness of pitch counts, the emphasis on OBP on offense and even effective starters now routinely going 6 innings or less (see Matsuzaka, Daisuke), the bullpen is of extreme importance, maybe to the point of being on par with the starting rotation (that’s an overstatement, but I think it is true with most teams, for starters 3-5 in their rotations). Thus, why not deal from strength.
In other words, with the paucity of good starting pitching, I see the script now as follows: you build a good bullpen including a reliable 8th inning guy and a 9th inning stud, and you hope your #3-5 starters to go 5-6 innings and keep the game close. Then you hope to beat up the other team’s bullpen and win it with your strength at the end.
Wouldn’t a team like the Royals be better off doing that? Good relievers cost much less than even average starters, so it fits the budget. Young flamethrowers who cannot make it as starters, because they don’t add in the secondary pitches, can be effective an inning at a time. And if you build an offense around big OBP in order to get the other team’s good starters out of the game based on pitch count (and here’s a BIG PROBLEM for the Royals, see Jacobs, Mike), you level the playing field a bit – my bullpen against yours.
Just a thought.
I’d like to see Jason Isringhausen’s CLOSER+ number for 2008.
Then again, I like to see the aftermath of really bad car accidents, too. I’m just that kind of sicko.
Hoyt Wilhelm, Charlie Hough, Wilbur Wood. Wow, seems like managers never can figure out how to handle their knuckleballers, can they? He’s a reliever, no, he’s a starter, no, he’s a reliever. (although I can pretty much guarantee no ML manager would have the internal fortitude to make a knuckleballer his closer nowadays, talk about ulcers)
On the baserunning stats, do these take into account the unaccounted for in the stat sheet bases, when the runner “moves up” on the throw home?
Pitching, more than anything else in playing baseball, is mental. It is repeating exactly the same action with only the tiniest of adjustments, and knowing what adjustments to make. It is making the batters guess wrong by altering pitch selection. Hitting and fielding are all responding to other circumstances; pitching initiates everything.
That given, being a closer is more mental stress than almost any kind of pitching. Okay, I imagine guys like Webb, Santana, and Sabathia, in the heat of a pennant race, knowing their team *needs* them to do well to have a shot at the postseason, has comparable stress levels. But every game the closer pitches is almost by definition a close game, a game with little or no margin of error. Plus, starters are generally noted for an assortment of pitches, and hitters have a harder time sitting on just one pitch. And starters throw many innings per start. Their success is rarely limited by familiarity. Closers, on the other hand, often depend on just one or two pitches, usually throw just one inning, and the more their pitches get seen and can be reviewed on video, the less likely they are to be effective.
Frankie Rodriguez saved more games than anybody in the history of baseball this season, and on top of all that he did so for a playoff team, so the games were more meaningful than, say, the games the Wilsons or Soria saved. That’s more times he faced the mental stress of coming in to the game. That’s more times teams saw him pitch, and thus more times he had to go to his lesser pitches in order to fool guys who saw him pitch the night before as well.
Nothing against Soria, who had a great year. But K-Rod’s expected saves were ten higher than anybody’s actual saves, and of course his actual saves were ten more than that. I’d expect anybody to lose some effectiveness under that workload, just from the mental stress. So whatever formula you’re using (and why you didn’t publish it is beyond me; it’s not impossible somebody here would have made a suggestion that you would have accepted as an improvement) should have some tiny component that adds a fraction for each save situation entered, say +.05 for each save situation. As a computer game designer, I’d actually write an algorithm with a small bit of scaling (the 40th save opportunity, with its accumulated stress, is tougher than then 10th) but not knowing the proper inflection points, I’m not sure what numbers to use. It would be an interesting item for study, methinks, if I were a baseball professional of some sort. I’m not, though.
When the Joba debates were raging, I thought about reliever usage and thought that his best role would be as a “bridge man”. The Royals should employ Soria in the same way in 2009. Heck, if I managed the Rays, I’d consider using David Price as a bridge man next season.
You’d keep a standard bullpen of one-inning guys and left-handed specialists, but the “bridge man” would enter in the 5th, 6th, or 7th inning to replace a shaky starter with the intent of finishing the game (or, if you have a dominant closer like Mo Rivera, handing the ball off in the 9th) and pitch twice on every turn of the rotation.
So his stat line would be approx. 60 games, 150 well-leveraged innings, a lot of decisions, and, if you don’t have Mo to wrap up, 20 or so saves. I think it’s a fabulous outside-the-box idea.
Plus, the bridge man would give you an extra bench player (b/c you replace two 70 IP pitchers with one 150 IP pitcher).
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