Joe Posnanski

OK, so my mind is a bit scrambled here in Kansas City with Priest Holmes about to play a game on Sunday and the Royals having made what I think is an absolutely fabulous hire in Trey Hillman. Plenty more on both of those items later (there’s a big surprise coming from your local correspondent here), but first I wanted to do a little breakdown of the Indians and Red Sox.

This rambles all over the place, but to the commenter who wanted his money back because the blogs were getting too short … here you go.

I’m interested in how teams get good. I don’t mean the process of building a team — though that is interesting too. I’m talking here about the last climb, the thing that they called “the push over the cliff” in “Spinal Tap.” Last year, the Red Sox were mediocre. They won 86 games, but they were actually outscored for the season. They had a pretty miserable finish, They were 11th in the AL in ERA.

Last year, the Indians were mediocre. They finished below .500 (even though they outscored their opponents by 88 runs. They were 33-20 in the so-called blowout games (games decided by five or more runs) which means they were 45-64 in games decided by four runs or less. Which ain’t good.

This year, the Sox and Indians are probably the two best teams in baseball.

So how did it happen happened? I know it’s a different year, different players, different injury situations, all that, but I’m curious: What is it that separates a talented but ultimately disappointing team (I think Boston and Cleveland both fit that category in 2006) and a truly outstanding team?

Boston Red Sox
2006: 86-75, 820 runs (6th in AL), 825 runs allowed (11th in AL)
2007: 96-66, 867 runs (3rd in AL); 657 runs allowed (1st in AL)

Well, the obvious here is that Boston, despite having the best hitters/worst pitchers park in baseball,, gave up 168 fewer runs in 2007. That’s more than a run per game, which is an astonishing drop. Best I can tell, there are three big and fairly obvious reasons for this.

1. The improvement of Josh Beckett.
2. The addition of Dice-K.
3. The complete turnaround of the bullpen.

– Josh Beckett was definitely a whole lot better in 2007. He pitched almost exactly the same number of innings, but his strikeouts were way up, walks way down, he gave up an amazing 19 fewer home runs and his ERA dropped from 5.01 to 3.27. Maybe you could chalk this up to maturity (though from what I can tell about Beckett, I’ll say “no”) maybe to him adapting to Boston, maybe to health. Whatever, he alone had a 44-run drop, more than one run per start.

– Matsuzaka had a disappointing finish (his last six starts he had a 7.53 ERA) but considering he was more or less taking the starts that in 2006 had belonged to Matt Clement (6.61 ERA), Kyle Snyder (6.02 ERA) and Jason Johnson (7.36 ERA), he without a doubt had a huge stabilizing effect on the Red Sox pitching staff. He didn’t have to be great (though he was on occasion). He just had to be good.

General manager often talk about “innings eaters” and I think that’s overrated if those guys have high ERAs. Jose Lima ate 169 innings for the Royals in 2005, but since he had a 6.99 ERA, those were more or less useless innings. You can’t tell me Lima helped the team in any way that year — there are dozens of Class AAA pitchers who could have done that.

However, Matsuzaka threw 205 innings with an above-league ERA of 4.40, and that was just a huge addition. I know there are those who thought Dice-K has been a disappointment — and since people were calling him Dice Koufax-Gibson-Feller-Johnson before the season began, yeah, there was some disappointment. But, having a reliable above-average starter going every fifth day was critical for the Red Sox, I think.

– I know there are different opinions about the importance of a bullpen, and I’m not smart enough to really argue one way or another. But I can tell you this. In 2006, the Red Sox bullpen gave up 275 runs in about 500 innings. This season, they gave up 103 fewer runs in 56 fewer innings.

Obviously the drop in innings tells you the starters were pitching more — again this is mostly because of Matsuzaka. The drop in runs is mostly because of the acquisition of Hideki Okajima, who stepped into the Mike Timlin role and pitched great (69 innings, 2.22 ERA), and the newfound ability of Manny Delcarmen to get people out (his ERA dropped from 5.06 to 2.05, mainly because he stopped giving up hits — the league hit .309 against him in ‘06; hit .183 in ‘07, even though he had more or less the same strikeout-walk ratio).

Funny thing is that’s about it. There are a few other smaller factors — Javier Lopez threw more innings, Kyle Snyder pitched a lot better in relief, etc. But mainly the Red Sox went from the 11th best ERA in the AL to No. 1 because one young starting pitcher really emerged, one expensive free agent pitcher pitched about as expected (or perhaps even a tad worse) and the bullpen was shored up by a Japanese import and a hard-throwing righty. That’s really not that much, if you think about it. In a way it’s encouraging to think how quickly you can turn things around.

Meanwhile, the offense scored 47 more runs and not to oversimplify it, but this seems to be mostly because of the excellent year that Mike Lowell had. It wasn’t ALL Lowell, but I would say he’s more than half of it. His OBP went up almost 40 points, his slugging went up 26 points, he drove in 40 more RBIs, in large part because his batting average with runners in scoring position jumped from .268 to .358. This leads to a little side discussion on clutch hitting I had recently with the Detroit Free Press’ brilliant columnist Michael Rosenberg.

SIDE DISCUSSION ON CLUTCH HITTING: Michael cannot help but believe in clutch hitting. He understands that clutch hitting is hard to find in the statistics. He appreciates this. Michael is not someone who pooh-poohs statistics. But he believes in clutch hitting. He cannot help it.

Michael’s reasoning is both simple and, from a purely logical perspective, persuasive: How can there NOT be an ability to hit clutch situations? There is no question that some people perform better under pressure than others. Even in our business, sports writing, there are some people who consistently write better under intense deadline pressure than others. I imagine you can see this in all walks of life. Some waiters/waitresses handle extremely busy restaurant nights better than others. Some doctors certainly perform much better under Emergency Room intensity and time constraints than others. Some comedians perform better in a hot room with drunken taunters than others.

And, perhaps most revealing, some pitchers clearly seem to PITCH better in the clutch than others. Michael brought up this whole discussion after Thursday’s game, when Josh Beckett once again dominated an October game, while C.C. Sabathia once again plotzed around and pitched like there was a big, ugly spider staring at home from bottom of the pitcher’s mound.

I offer two thoughts about this, and both might be complete nonsense because I have not really organized my thoughts here. But, hey, when has that stopped me? It’s my blog, so I’ll throw them out there.

1. It isn’t that I don’t believe in clutch hitting — I do believe in it. You have to believe in clutch hitting; it’s like gravity or Britney Spears. It’s there every day. Man on second, two outs, tie score, late innings, base hit, that’s a clutch hit. Strikeout in same situation. That’s NOT a clutch hit.

No, the question is not : Does clutch hitting exist ?The question (or at least the first question) is: Are some players consistently BETTER at hitting in the clutch than others?

To me the answer is: Of course. David Ortiz is a lot better hitting in the clutch than Joey Gathright. But this is the point: David Ortiz is ALWAYS a lot better at hitting a baseball than Joey Gathright. Of course I believe that there are players who hit better in the clutch than other players. However, in almost ever case, with very few exceptions (and these exceptions might be statistical anomalies, or there might be a very occasional freak of nature or they might not exist at all) these are the same players who hit better than other players in ALL situations.

This leads to the second question: Are some players consistently BETTER at hitting in the clutch than they are when not hitting the clutch? I think this is what a lot of people believe — that some people raise their game when the chips are down and the game’s on the line and the cliches are flying.

But, when you think about it that way, it’s pretty absurd, isn’t it? See, turn this argument upside down, the logic changes.

Yes, some sports writers write better on deadline than others. But how many sports writers consistently write a lot better on deadline than they do when NOT on deadline? None. At least I don’t know any. How many waiters/waitresses serve BETTER when they have 20 tables rather than 10 or 5? How many doctors perform better in an Emergency Room setting than they do in a quieter, more relaxed setting?

George Brett was a great clutch hitter. He’s the one guy that Bill James has said seems to make a case for the idea of clutch hitting. Brett hit .307 (with a .410 on-base percentage) with runners in scoring position throughout his career. He was almost always good in the playoffs (he hit nine homers in 27 playoff games, including some very memorable ones). He almost singlehandedly carried the Royals to the 1985 World Series — his Game 3 performance against Toronto in the ALCS remains one of the greatest game anyone has ever played under pressure.

But was George Brett — the ultimate example — BETTER under intense pressure than he was at other times? Maybe. Maybe 1% better. Maybe .03% better. Maybe not better at all. Brett hit .307 with runners in scoring position (and was walked significantly more) but he hit .304 with runners NOT in scoring position. He’s one of the greatest postseason hitters ever, but in back-to-back playoff series — 1981 and 1984 — hit went 5 for 25 (all five hits were singles) without a single RBI or run scored.

And this is GEORGE BRETT. The guy who hit three homers off of Catfish Hunter in a playoff game. The guy who took Goose Gossage deep in 1980 to finally put away those Bronx is Burning Yankees. The guy who hit two homers and made a miraculous defensive play to beat Toronto in that famous Game 3. The guy who hit .370 and .375 in his two World Series appearances. He will be the first to tell you. He choked too.

2. OK, even if I don’t believe that players consistently perform better in the clutch than other times, what about the reverse? Do some players choke more often in the clutch? Do some players hit worse when the game is on the line, when the pressure is at its hottest, when the postseason is at its height? Wow, this is turning into a Dane Cook soliloquy. There is only one Actober.

Yeah, it seems likely that, every so often, nerves will get to a player. Maybe nerves is the wrong word: Hitters will press. Hitting is all about reaction — and many hitters have said they are at their best when relaxed, when their mind was blank, when it was really all about (as Doggie Tony Perez always said) “See the ball hit the ball.” So, sure, it seems a lot more likely that some players hit a little worse in those clutch situations than they would at other times — especially young players — because they have a little noise going on in their heads.

As much as I though the whole A-Rod thing was blown out of proportion, he did look DIFFERENT in the postseason, especially after he started to struggle.

BUT, just being around these guys, I doubt this is much of a factor. For one thing, baseball is about the long season, you will get so many at-bats — thousands and thousands of them if you stay in the big leagues — and after a while the whole thing becomes second nature. After all, you come to the play 600 times in a season, maybe half of those with men on base, a good number of those with the game close, I’ve got to believe that you couldn’t perform at all if you got significantly more nervous in some situations than in others.

And that brings up another part: I’m sure there ARE players out there who fold under pressure. We call these men: “Minor league players” or “insurance salesmen” or even “general managers.” You could not survive as a player in the big leagues for any length of time, it seems to me, if nerves or pressure caused you to perform poorly. I’m not saying players don’t have something resembling nerves. I’m saying those nerves do not paralyze them the way they might paralyze you or me.

Now is it different for pitchers? Just my opinion, but, yeah, it’s possible that it is slightly different. Pitching is “action” while hitting is “reaction” and though I haven’t studied it at all, I was reading somewhere that nerves tend to have a greater effect on the action (hitting a golf ball, making a jump shot, pitching a baseball into a strike zone) than the reaction. Maybe. I don’t know. I could have misread that too.

Josh Beckett has been great in big games. But you know what? He’s been pretty damn good all year.

Cleveland Indians
2006: 78-84, 870 runs (2nd in AL), 782 runs allowed (7th in AL)
2007: 96-77, 811 runs (6th in AL), 704 runs allowed (3rd in AL)

The Indians’ story is obviously very different. For one thing, it seems apparent they REALLY underachieved in 2006. Look: They actually scored 59 fewer runs than they did in 2006. True, they also gave up 78 fewer runs, but the point is their overall run differential wasn’t significantly better in 2007. Still, they won many more games. Why?

Well, from what I can see, maybe this is John Madden obvious, a lot of it comes down to simply winning more close games. In 2006, the Indians were 18-26 in one-run games. In 2007, they were 29-24. That’s 11 more victories and two fewer losses in those one-run games — which seems to explain a large part of the Indians improvement.

In 2006, the Indians were 5-3 in extra innings. That’s a very low number of extra inning games. In 2007, the Indians were 11-8.

Why did the Indians play so many more close games in 2007 (and why did they play better in those close games?). Most if comes down to better pitching. And I’m going to throw out a goofy theory for you to laugh at: I think it was all about the sixth and eighth innings.

I had a manager tell me once that the two most important innings in a game are the sixth and eighth innings. He was drunk at the time (or at least I suspect he was drunk) and I have to say that I thought he was also a bit crazy. But, looking back now, there may be some logic to this. The sixth inning could be crucial because, these days, that tends to be when your starter faded. I believe the average start in baseball is 5 2/3 innings, but I can’t find that statistic now so that could be wrong. But it’s around there. The sixth inning is that shaky inning where you generally have either a tired starter or a scary middle reliever out there.

And the eighth could be crucial because teams these days use their closers — supposedly their best relievers — almost exclusively in the ninth inning (when leading). That means a team’s second, third, fourth or fifth best reliever might be pitching the eighth, even in a close game. In rare rare cases, a starter might still be in there too.

In 2006, the Indians gave up 130 runs in the sixth inning. They gave up 87 runs in the eighth.
In 2007, the Indians gave up 99 runs in the sixth inning. They gave up 53 runs in the eighth.

There you go: That seems like a pretty good formula to stay in more games. In just those two innings, the Indians gave up 65 fewer runs. I’m not saying the WHOLE story is there. It’s almost all there, though.

Why were the Indians better in the sixth? Not to oversimplify things, but I suspect that a lot of it comes down to Fausto Carmona. He emerged and became one of the best starters in baseball. Considering he took up starts that in 2006 were being made by Cliff Lee and Jason Johnson (yeah Jason Johnson was bad for BOTH Cleveland and Boston in 2006) you can see the difference. Also, C.C. Sabathia pitched a little bit stronger into the late innings in 2007. Also, Cleveland middle relief with Tom Mastny and Aaron Fultz may have been better than their 2006 counterparts. I think Carmona is the biggest factor.

(Carmona actually did not pitch that great in the sixth — it was his worst inning. He gave up 18 runs in 30 sixth inning appearances. But he was a lot better than what Cleveland had, plus he helped save the bullpen).

The difference in the eighth inning obviously comes down to the dominating performances of Rafael Perez (60 2/3 innings, 41 hits, 62 K, 1.78 ERA) and Rafael Betancourt (79 1/3 inning, 51 hits, 80 K, 1.47 ERA). Against those two, the league hit .173 in the eighth inning this year . I believe dominant setup men are HUGE for success.

Offensively, the Indians were down overall in 2007, in large part because of a huge drop of production from Travis Hafner. Pronk may have been the best hitter in the AL in 2006 (.308/.439/,659, 42 homers, 117 RBIs) and he was somewhere in the realm of below-adequate in 2007 (.266/.385/.451 — he still got on base, but yikes, how about a TWO HUNDRED POINT drop in slugging? — 24 homers, 100 RBIs in 23 more games, bad news).

But interestingly enough, the Indians scored a few more runs in the eighth and ninth innings this season, and that might have made the difference in some close games.

* * *

So to sum up, I think the Red Sox became a great team because Beckett got good, Dice K was a big addition, the bullpen got some people out and Mike Lowell had a good year.

I think the Indians became a great team because Carmona got good, the two setup men were dominant, and the Indians already high-powered offense came through in the late innings to help the Indians win close games.

I don’t think there’s anything too ground-breaking there. But it proves a point that I have long believed and that is that the difference between a good team and a great team isn’t much. The Brewers, for instance, had an OK year and faded late. But to me, if Ben Sheets has a Beckett/Carmona like year next year, pitchers like Manny Parra and Derrick Turnbow break out and, say, Bill Hall or J.J. Hardy or someone like that has a big year, they could win 95 games.

And as for the Royals …

We’ll get back to them in a bit.